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The Indonesian Navy recognized the need for a computer security program over ten years
ago. They published their first computer security regulation in 1981. But that regulation is
now obsolete because of the advances in technology and the increased availability of
powerful computer systems. As computer systems become bigger, more complicated,
easier to use, more interconnected, and more important, they become more vulnerable to
hackers, terrorist, and disgruntled employees.
This thesis demonstrates the need for an updated computer security regulation. To add
in meeting that need, the thesis proposes a security program for the Indonesian Navy that
is based on the multilevel trusted computer criteria published by the NCSC in the 'Orange
Book', the Canadian Trusted Product Evaluation Criteria and ITSEC. The proposed
program includes additional regulations concerning physical security, data security,
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A. COMPUTER SECURITY IN GENERAL
As computer systems have developed, they have produced spectacular changes in
many organizations, affecting everything from office correspondence and personnel data
processing to real-time process control. With computer systems, great amounts of paper
records are no longer needed, reducing storage requirements and the time needed to search
records. Computer systems have brought many improvements.
This valuable tool requires protection. That protection is what computer security is all
about. Computer security means protecting the computer and everything that is associated
with it. These associative items include the room or building, the terminals and printers,
the cabling, and the storage devices such as disks and tapes. Most importantly, computer
security means protecting the information in the system [RUSS91, p. 8].
For many years computers were isolated from the outside world. Security required
only securing the room or the building and controlling the people that programmed or
operated the computers. Links to the outside were unusual. Computer security threats
were rare, and were basically concerned with insiders: authorized users misusing
accounts, theft and vandalism (HOLB91, p. 6]. A good lock and a security guard were
enough to secure the computer from any physical attack.
With the development of communication networks, computers were connected to one
another: first by specially-engineered dedicated lines and then by common telephone
lines. Now many systems are in private offices and labs, often managed by individuals
employed outside a computer center. Many of these systems are connected to the Internet
where they have access to and can be accessed by systems around the world. The United
States, Europe, Asia, and Australia are all connected [HOLB91, p. 6]. Many of these
computer systems, such as the systems used in banking, operate 24 hours a day. Thus, the
definition of computer security has grown well past the locked room with a guard at the
door.
While the fundamental concepts of computer security, protect the information and the
equipment, are the same, applying these principles is much more complicated. Computer
security consists of maintaining three characteristics: secrecy, integrity, and availability
[PFLE89, p. 4]. Secrecy, also called confidentiality, means that only authorized persons
can access the information assets. Integrity means that only authorized persons can modify
the information. Availability means that the information is always available for authorized
use.
The effectiveness of a security program is highly dependent on the attitudes and
amount of security training that the personnel using the system have. To maintain its
value, the security program must continually be reviewed for effectiveness and relevance.
In every organization, security should be made an integral component of the corporate
culture and made a personal issue for all. In many quarters there is still a lack of security
awareness among corporate and organization managers. Quite often, any awareness that
does exist is limited to the more obvious physical requirements. [DITT90, p. 30]
To create a secure operating environment the computer system must be viewed in
terms of what can damage it or compromise the information it contains. That is, it must be
reviewed in terms of its vulnerabilities. Any occurrence that can damage the system at one
of these vulnerable points is a threat. Computer security is concerned with identifying the
threats to the system and protecting against those threats. [RUSS91, p. 1 1]
Russel and Ganggemi [RUSS91, p. 12] divide threats into three (3) categories:
natural, unintentional, and intentional. A typhoon or an earthquake may not intend to do
damage, but can destroy the system. The curious employee that walks over to a new
terminal and spills a cup of coffee into the monitor probably did not intended to destroy
any equipment, but the system must be secured against him as well as the digruntled
employee that did not get promoted and tries to erase all the financial reports for the last
three years. A comprehensive computer security program must recognize and plan for all
these disasters and many more.
B. COMPUTER SYSTEMS IN INDONESIA
The computer industry is very young in Indonesia. In general, computers are a great
luxury. Very few persons or industries have access to computers. Common society views
computers as "very clever things." They don't believe they can use these clever things.
Managers view computers as devices made by men and therefore very unreliable. Schools
and universities do not offer computer science as a separate course of study. Rather,
courses are offered as part of another curriculum such as electrical engineering.
Furthermore, there is almost no industrial base; the majority of all hardware and software
is imported from Japan and the United States, with some components imported from
Korea, China and Singapore.
The threats to the computer and information systems can be very sophisticated. As in
many countries, there are always individuals that are much more capable than the general
public. If a terrorist group wanted to hurt the government and they could not recruit a local
person with the necessary expertise, they could hire someone from another country.
Because most people are unsophisticated, it is easy for the system operators and users to
become careless about enforcing the security program. This provides just the opening that
a hacker needs. Additionally, due to the lack of copyright laws and the relatively high
price of new software, there is a tremendous amount of passing copies from user to user,
providing optimum conditions for spreading viruses and worms. The computer security
regulations must deal with both of these threats.
Currently, there are several mainframe computers that are being used by industry and
government. The banking industry was the first industry to utilize an information system,
primarily to automate their accounting systems; however it is still unusual to see a teller
with a front-end terminal. There are two (2) primary reasons for this; first, acquisition and
installation are still relatively expensive. Second, and perhaps harder to overcome,
managers do not trust the tellers to send information directly to the computer. Network
connections between the main office and the branch offices have not been installed yet,
mainly because security problems have not been resolved.
The biggest government user of automation is the Department of Defense (DoD). The
DoD currently uses computers mainly in support of personnel, payroll, and logistics
management. As real-time computing has advanced, the DoD is increasingly developing
and acquiring computers for combat systems. As a result of this growing reliance upon
real-time information systems the Department of Defense built a computer center to
support the software used in combat systems.
Several other Government offices use computers to support their efforts. Computers
are used for producing documents such as ID cards and drivers licences. But use is limited
to the larger cities because of the lack of spare parts and maintenance personnel in the
rural areas.
The telecommunications network is still too immature to support modem
connections. The backbone systems are terrestrial and satellite microwave with some
larger cities using sea cables. The phone system itself is not computerized, it relies almost
exclusively on human operators. Cross talk and interference are routine problems because
of physical plant limitations. And there is insufficient channel capacity for the voice traffic
alone. The use of more satellite capacity is the best chance for increased modem activity.
As indicated above, there is no commercial software development in Indonesia. Both
operating system software and application software originates in the United States or
Japan. One barrier to local software production is the lack of effective copyright
protection. Software piracy is a regular occurrence because of the weak laws. These laws
will have to be strengthened before there is an incentive to write computer programs.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
Since the current standards and regulations in use by the Indonesian Navy were
written in 19X1, and today the Navy is installing a series of computers operating over a
local area network (LAN), which is expected to grow until it is interconnected nationwide,
than the objectives in writing this thesis are:
1
.
To conduct a literature search of computer security articles.
2. Review and critique of the current computer security policies of the Indonesian
Navy.
3. To develop a strategic computer security policy for the Indonesian Navy.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is presented in five (5) chapters. Chapter II provides the fundamental
concepts of computer security, what standard regulations are needed, and provides a
preliminary threat assessment and the controls needed to protect it. It also explains some
models for Multilevel Security and some security issues from the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany and Canada.
Chapter III is a review of the current computer security policy of the Indonesian
Navy, the computer systems being used and the policy elements that need to be upgraded.
Chapter IV outlines the need for a computer security policy for the Indonesian Navy and
proposes an evaluation guide for the Indonesian Navy as a basic step for implementing
multilevel security in computer systems. Chapter V includes a summary, conclusion and
recommendations. These recommendations define immediate, intermediate and long term
actions should be taken concerning computer security.
The appendix contains the recommended Trusted Evaluation Guide for use by the
Indonesian Navy.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS OF COMPUTER SECURITY
There are several concepts that serve as a foundation for a good computer security
program: maintaining system integrity, protecting privacy, and building a cost-effective
security program. The best method for satisfying these criteria is a trusted multilevel
security system.
To achieve the goals of computer security, that is maintaining the three
characteristics of privacy, integrity and cost-effectiveness, the first thing to do is recognize
the threats to the computer system. By recognizing the potential threat, the actions to
defend against those threats can be defined.
A. COMPUTER SYSTEM INTEGRITY
The first step is to physically isolate and protect the system. The goal is to keep
hostile forces out of the system. Second, if the hostile force gets into the system, then the
system must be able to identify, contain and record the actions of the infiltrator. Finally, it
is important to establish sound backup procedures to facilitate recovery in event of
complete contamination or destruction of the computer system.
Maintaining computer system integrity begins with securing the system against the
most basic threats: storms, floods, power failures, and progresses up to the most
sophisticated threats: espionage agents planted in user organizations, electronic-
eavesdropping, and computer hackers with their own advanced computers. The
organization cannot install a security system and forget about it; the system must be
constantly reviewed to keep pace with the evolving threat and re-evaluated against the
growing dependency of the user organizations on the automated systems.
1. Physical Integrity
Physical protection is the most important measure of computer system security.
If the physical security of the system is not guaranteed, then the system can not be
considered secure. This physical protection includes the guard, the room and building
construction, the door lock, fences around the building, etc. These protect the system from
natural disaster, human vandals, interception, and unauthorized user.[LANE85, p. 13 -IS,
PFLE89, p.437 - 442, and RUSS91, p.238 - 240]
Natural disasters like floods, fires, earthquakes, lightning, power loss, heat, etc.,
constitute a threat to the physical integrity of a computer system. Not only is the physical
hardware at risk, but also the information residing in the system. In many, cases the
information is more valuable then the hardware itself. (PFLE89, p. 438]
One natural threat is water, which can easily damage the electronic components
and electrical systems used to support it. Water damage can occur because of the flooding
of a river or the sea, a hard rain or even a leaking water pipe. To prevent this kind of
disaster the computer system should be placed in a room high enough to be unreachable
by water that rises from the ground.
In addition to flooding, water falling from above the equipment is also
dangerous. This is usually caused by a leaking water pipe above the equipment or a
leaking roof or ceiling. In order to prevent this kind of disaster the administrator should
regularly inspect the possible sources of water damage. Secondly, rolls of plastic sheeting
should be mounted on the walls of the computer room so that the equipment can be
covered in a matter of minutes in case of an emergency.
Fire is another natural disaster that can cause great damage quickly. In order to
prevent this kind of damage water is not recommended, since water also damages the
electronic devices. A fire resistant wall and door, and a windowless room for the computer
installation is suggested in order to slow the spread of fire from adjacent rooms.
Furthermore, smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers using inert gases are
recommended for fire suppression.
Electrical power systems are critical to computer systems. If the power is
suddenly lost or drops below a certain value, the possibility of losing code or data that is
not yet saved becomes almost certain. To prevent loss of code or data caused by a power
loss an uninterruptible power supply is recommended. An uninterruptible power supply
stores electrical energy during normal operation and is automatically turned on when the
power is lost.
Protection against spikes or surges of electrical power is also required. If a spike
exceeds the specified level of the equipment, then it can damage the electronic
components. In order to prevent this, a surge suppressor is needed.
Heat is another natural problem common to tropical countries like Indonesia.
Electronic components inside the computer system are sensitive to heat. If the heat
exceeds a certain level then the components may work improperly or sustain damage.
Preventing the accumulation of excessive heat requires a continuous flow of cold air.
Humans also pose a threat to the physical integrity of the systems. Vandals and
disgruntled employees may intentionally damage the system, and users and visitors may
unintentionally cause damage. All of these are threats to the physical integrity of the
computer system.
Defending against vandals is an important feature of physical protection.
Vandals are different from natural disasters, since the damage is intentionally or
unintentionally caused by people. They can be disgruntled employees, bored operators,
saboteurs, or people that get a thrill from destroying things. If their tool of destruction is
something that is big enough to see, such as a sledge hammer, then they can be stopped
before they damage the equipment. If they use small items, such a car key or even a paper
clip to disable a disk drive, then it will difficult to detect them before they strike. A strict
visitor control policy will help reduce this threat.
Physical damage remains the greatest threat to computer security. The next
section explains threats against software and data integrity.
2. Software And Data Integrity
Attacks on the software and data are more difficult to prevent and track, since the
damage may not be visible, but they can completely disrupt the operation of the system.
Deletion or modification of valuable data can cause grave damage to individuals,
organizations or even whole nations. The damage caused by or actions done by human
threats may go completely unnoticed by the operators until the results from the system
differ from what is required on a given situation.
The threat to software can also come from an unintended source. Some programs
produce unintended results, degrade system efficiency, or destroy data. While this is not
deliberate sabotage, the effects are significant and must be mitigated. In an ideal world,
damage to a system by unintended results would be prevented, but research and practice in
the area of system reliability has shown that this ideal protection is unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
a. Internal Threat
The most difficult threat to counter comes from inside the organization
itself. A malicious worker can introduce a virus or do many kinds of damage to the
system, which may be done in a such manner that it remains undiscovered for a long time.
Furthermore, an innocent employee may damage the system without realizing it. A hard-
working employee may bring work home, infect his disk and bring it back to work and
infect the system. Good backups, archiving and antivirus software will mitigate most of
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the damage caused by infection. A system of file protections, not modifiable by ordinary
software, will prevent the spread of many viruses.
Depending on the security of the computer system, it may be possible for an
employee to change the classification of a file. An employee with a high-level security
clearance, who can access a highly-classified file, may intentionally or unintentionally
change the classification of a file to a lower level, or disclose it to an unauthorized
employee or an external agent: any of which could cause great damage.
Modification of the software must also be controlled. Without such controls,
changing a little code in a program can be done by anyone. The program may seem to
work well, but in a specialized condition the program will fail [PFLE89, p. 7]. One
example of this type of modification is a time bomb. An infected program will work, well
in almost all cases, but upon detecting a specific condition, such as a system load level or
the name of a certain operation, the program will fail or do some other damage to the
system.
Programs need to be secured since they can be used to exploit vulnerabilities
in computing system in one of two ways. First, they can intercept or modify data on behalf
of users not authorized to access the data. Second, they can exploit service flaws in system
to allow system access to unauthorized users and inhibit the use of legitimate users. Some
programs commonly used to access data and affect computer services are described below.
(1) Trapdoors. A trapdoor is a secret undocumented entry point into a
module. It is usually inserted during program development for testing, maintenance, and
debugging purposes. Sometimes it is not removed, and as a result it exposes the system to
modification during execution. [PFLE89, p. 170, and RUSS91, p. 85]
(2) Viruses. Viruses are programs that can infect other programs by
modifying them. [PFLE89, p. 178] All viruses require a host, and the range and rate of the
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spread of the infection depends on sharing and transitivity of programs or data.Viruses
must have access to other programs and data in order to spread. Thus, limiting sharing can
limit viral infections.
Viruses are prevalent in personal computers because so much software
swapped between users that it is easy for viruses to spread to different systems. The weak
copyright laws in Indonesia is one reason that there is so much swapping there. The
positive side is that software is being developed to combat viruses and can be imported
from developed countries. The use of anti-viral software should be stipulated in the
security regulation.
A virus program has three parts. The first is a marker that is used to
determine if a program has been previously infected (signature byte). The second is the
infector which seeks out potential carriers and is responsible for the infection process. The
third part is an optional trigger that, upon determining that current conditions match an
activation segment, trigger the manipulator. The fourth part is the manipulator that is
responsible for carrying out the program's designed task.
Viruses are categorized as either overwriting or non-overwriting.
Overwriting viruses are the easiest to write and do not increase the length of the host
program. They actually overwrite the code of the host programs and as a result, the host
program will generally produce an error during execution.
A non-overwriting virus appends itself to the host program and causes
an increase in the file size, actually it copies a portion of the host's code and appends it to
the end of the file then overwrites the other portion. During execution the virus checks the
trigger and if applicable, executes the manipulation code. Once completed it then moves
the host's copied portion of code to the front of the file and executes the host code
normally.
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Viruses have some known weaknesses. All viruses have markers and
the host program has to be executed in order to execute the viruses' codes. They must
change some segment, therefore they leave tracks of their presence.
There are many types of viruses: boot sector viruses, system software
viruses, application software viruses, hardware viruses placed by actually modifying the
hardware, buffered viruses that install themselves in RAM, live and die viruses that remain
for a certain period then remove themselves, and hide and seek viruses that move to
different areas of the system.
A few of the ways to limit the spread of viruses are: complete isolation
of infected systems, subdivision of data and programs, write protect all disks that are not to
be written to, don't share disks, on the fly encryption, and limiting transitive flow of
information (A to B, B to C, thus A to C).
(3) Trojan Horses. A Trojan horse is a program that performs a hidden
function in addition to its stated functions. A virus can carry a Trojan horse program, such
that the infected programs perform an unintended function. fPFLE89, p. 172, and
RUSS91,p. 83]
(4) Covert channels. A covert channel is a program that leaks information
to people who should not have it; they are a hidden means to communicate information.
They are best suited to situations where small amounts of data are needed.[PFLE89, p.
175]
(5) Worms. A worm is a program that can run independently and can
propagate a fully working version of itself on other machines. Worms do not need a host,
they are self propagating and stand-alone. Not all worms are malicious, as a matter of fact,
some worms are beneficial they perform automatic file compression and backup.
[PFLE89, p. 178, and RUSS91, p. 82]
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b. External Threat
Any outsider who has a connection with computer system may succeed in
infiltrating the organization and gaining access to the computer system. Then he can read,
modify, delete or copy the software or data. This is an external threat that should be
considered.
As the Indonesian Navy starts to develop Local Area Networks (LAN) and
computer systems become inter-connected, it will be easier to conduct attacks on one
system from several remote hosts or many systems from one host. The modification of
data in a system is very difficult to recognize and to track since the host may not know that
some of its information has been modified by an unauthorized person.
An external intruder typically attempts to access a computer system through
the telecommunications networks. Several different types of attack may be attempted and
once access to the system has been achieved, the intruder may cause significant harm to
the system or the data.
Threats to hardware, software or data may cause severe damage to a
computer system. The next section explains what steps can be taken to minimize the
damage if all the planning fails to prevent damage.
3. Resumption after a Crisis
Security planners must assume that eventually they will fail and the system will
suffer severe damage. A recovery plan is needed in order to get the computer system
working as soon as possible. It can be achieved effectively if there is enough preparation.
It has been mentioned above that damage to the computer system can happen to the
hardware, software or data. To prepare for damage to the information, backup copies are
needed. If the damage is to the equipment, then a backup facility is needed. [PFLE89, p.
442-447, and RUSS91,p.96]
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A backup is a copy of all the software and data residing in the computer system.
A periodic backup needs to be performed so that the loss is limited to the work done
during the interval between backups. However, if the backup copy is maintained in the
same place, or near the same place, that the computer system is located then it can be
rendered useless, because the backup copy can also be destroyed during the crisis. Thus,
backups should be stored off-site.
Just as the data and programs are backed up, the hardware can be backed up.
Either a cold or a hot site can be used, based on the criticality of the system. A cold site is
used when the system is relatively less critical and time to outfit the facility is available. A
cold site has space, power and air conditioning. If the primary site is destroyed or severely
damaged, then new equipment is installed and the operation is moved to the backup site.
A hot site is used when the applications are critical. A hot site is a computer
facility with an installed and ready-to-run computing system [PFLE89, p. 444]. A hot site
not only has the space, power and air-conditioning, but also a complete computer system.
All that is required to get operational is load the latest backups and begin processing.
Obviously, to prepare and maintain a hot site is very expensive and can only be justified
when losing the processing system for several days or weeks would be more expensive. Hot
sites are reserved for systems processing critical data and applications.
B. PRIVACY
There are certain differences between privacy and security. Privacy is a
characterization of the special interest we have in being free from certain kinds of
intrusion [JOHNX5, p. 194]. Privacy is strongly rooted in ethics and morals. James
Martin's definitions show the important distinction between privacy and security. Data
security refers to protection of data against accidental or intentional disclosure,
unauthorized modifications, and destruction. Privacy refers to the rights of individuals and
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organizations to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is to be transmitted to others (MART73, p. 5].
The value of informational privacy depends on the situation and the ownership
condition of the information itself. An individuals bank balance is important to the
individual, but compromising it is not likely to damage national security. If an important
company is taken over by foreign competitors because private financial information was
compromised, then national security may very well be damaged. Additionally, the
perceived value of privacy varies from culture to culture. Societies establish and enforce
privacy laws very differently, with liberal societies providing the greatest protections and
totalitarian societies the weakest. Whatever the society, there is some cultural or legal
protection of privacy.
With improvements in computing systems, most private individual data is being
entered into computer records. For example in the military, some information may only be
read by the commanding officer, other information may be read by all officers, and some
information by all officers and enlisted. However, all this information may be kept in
computer records. As a consequence, privacy may be lost if the security system is
inadequate. Absolute privacy requires absolute security. There are no systems that provide
absolute security, but a trusted system will provide the best possible protection available.
It is obvious that the technology of privacy is closely related to security, however,
privacy is an issue that goes far beyond the computer system. Furthermore,
implementation of security to protect individual privacy in a computer system should be
calculated according to its cost effectiveness despite the inherent difficulties in
establishing the value of an individual's privacy to the organization installing the security
system.
James Martin defines four (4) levels of safeguards needed to protect the privacy of
individuals [MART73, p. 32 -33]. The first is locking the data in the system so that
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unauthorized user cannot read, modify, delete, or copy it. The second is an appropriate
system philosophy that specifies how the computer system should act on the individual
data, how the system will control which person can access each kind of data, what data
should not be collected and what classification should be assigned to the data. The third
level defines administrative controls and the fourth defines legal controls. The legal
controls are defined by existing law concerning the protection of privacy in the computer
system. The law concerning privacy depends on the culture and national philosophy. In
the liberal society the individual privacy is stated clearly, but in some other countries, the
laws protecting privacy, especially those concerned with computer technology do not exist
yet.
1. Theft Prevention
Unauthorized visitors can cause three problems: stealing machines or data,
destroying machines or data, or compromising the data, which can be very dangerous if
the data is very sensitive [PFLE89, p.444]. Some precautions can be taken to protect
against theft such as security guards, fences, locks, magnetic stripe cards, electronic cards,
and even gluing, weighting, chaining, and alarming portable devices.
Security guards, fences and locks are classical examples of theft prevention.
Guards have an advantage in that they can make a record of persons who access the
facility. However, guards must be employed 24 hours a day. And as human beings they
have human weaknesses that can be exploited, such as boredom, inaccuracies, illness, etc.
As a result, their reports may be inaccurate and they may even be so careless that they fail
to catch a thief. On the other hand, locks are much simpler and cheaper to use, but they
may not produce the record that is desired. The best system is a combination of guards,
fences and locks.
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More sophisticated controls use magnetic stripe cards or cards with radio
transmitters or other electronic identification system. These systems can interface with a
computer system which can automatically prepare an access report. The disadvantage is
that they can be lost or stolen and the finder can have access to the facility. To prevent
unauthorized persons from getting into the facility, the cards can be supplemented by a
keypad at the door that requires some kind of entry code from the person trying to get in.
Reducing portability of the equipment will also reduce the risk of theft.
Portability has increased as more powerful and expensive devices are built to fit on a desk
top. Some facilities use these kinds of computers for interfacing with a mainframe. Even
input/output devices, such as printers, are now portable devices. Since it is portable, it is
easy to steal. Steps must be taken to reduce theft, but excessive measures can make the
system difficult to use by the very persons it was installed to support. Measures commonly
used to protect the equipment include adding weights, gluing the equipment to a table,
chaining or locking the equipment down, or installing alarms. The weights and glue make
it difficult to move the equipment if there is a problem. Chains, locks and alarms are better
in these situations because they can be undone relatively quickly.
In addition to securing the equipment, attention must be given to taking care of
sensitive files. Printing a sensitive file should only be done when unauthorized personnel
are away from the printers. One option is to configure the system so that classified files
can only print on a printer in a secured area.
The last method for controlling theft is to install detectors in the door. These
detectors can sense individuals coming into or leaving the facility. If used in combination
with smart cards the detectors can even record which person comes and goes. This can
help reduce unauthorized traffic. But to prevent authorized users from taking equipment,
the equipment can have internal marking devices that will set off the alarms if they are
carried through the exit.
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Ideally, software theft will also be countered. Specifically, the security system
will prevent unauthorized copying of software. Since the original software itself is left
unchanged in the system, the owner has no indication that a theft has occurred.
Interception is another serious threat to computer security. To illustrate; a
repairman from outside the organization is responsible for repairing any damage or
malfunctions in the computer equipment. He can install a device that will be able to read
data and transmit it to a receiver that is outside of the secured area. Hence, valuable or
critical data is compromised. To avoid this, the technicians should submit to the same
clearance procedures that the operators submit to.
2. Disposal of Sensitive Media
Disposal of sensitive media may create a vulnerability. Media containing
sensitive information often needs to be disposed of. The media can be paper, magnetic-
tape or disks, printer ribbons, or even paper tape. They may have to be disposed of
because they are no longer useful, such as outdated reports, or the magnetic media may be
damaged. But even damaged media can be reconstructed if it falls into unfriendly hands.
The media must be destroyed beyond any ability to extract useful information. There are
many ways to dispose of these material. [PFLEX9, p.446]
Shredders are the most common devices to use. They can be used to destroy
paper, printer ribbons, floppy disks and some tapes. The disadvantage is that the most
common shredders cut the media into long strips that, in the case of paper, can be
reconstructed and read. In these cases shredding is only an intermediate step to burning.
The reason to shred the paper before burning it is that the burning is then much more
thorough.
There are several ways to destroy the information on magnetic media. The most
common is to overwrite the data several times with different characters. But this takes a
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certain program or utility. For many years users thought they were destroying their files by
deleting them, but most operating systems only released the disk space back to the system.
The data could remain on the disk and some other person could recover it with another
utility. To prevent this a write-three-times utility must be used when clearing files or
media. This can be a very time consuming requirement, but it is necessary to protect the
data.
Another way to erase the data is to use a magnetic degausser. A degausser is a
powerful magnet that realigns the magnetic particle and destroying the patterns that stored
the data. Some degaussers are moved over the media, others are built so that the media
passes through the magnets. This can be an effective method, but the degaussers must be
tested periodically to ensure that the field strength meets the specifications.
3. Emanation Protection
Emanation protection is divided into two categories. They are: protection from
outside emanations that can affect the operation of a system, and control of emanations
from the computer devices that can be detected outside the controlled area [PFLE89, p.
447-441].
First, emanations that affect operations can originate inside or outside the
facility. Many components of a computer system are sensitive to magnetic fluctuations.
For example, a floppy disk is sensitive to the magnetic fields produced by the
electromagnets in devices such as telephones, printers, and monitors. The data on the disk
can be ruined by these fields if the disk is set on or too close to this type of device. The
administrator should stress the vulnerabilities of magnetic media to the workers.
Secondly, the emanations from the equipment can be intercepted by persons
outside the are controlled by the users of the system. In some cases these emanations can
be demodulated and the data that the machine was processing at the time is compromised.
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A standard acceptable level of emanations and proper control procedures should be
determined and included in the security regulation. Some methods of control are: using low
emanation devices (TEMPEST approved), shielding the room or using shielded containers
around the worst equipment, and expanding the controlled area to a point that the
emanations are no longer detectable.
4. User Authentication
Computers need to verify users with authentication mechanisms, usually at the
time they log on. Authentication mechanisms are generally divided into three categories:
something you know, like a password; something you have, like smart card; and some
unique attribute, such as a finger print. |RUSS91, p. 57 -5X|
The most common authentications used on computer systems are passwords.
They are easy to implement and a person only needs to remember his password to access
the system. The password is a string of characters, a "word" that the computer is
programed to ask for when the user logs onto the system [PHLEX9, p. 226]. The
effectiveness of is limited by their length and the number of legal characters allowed in
each position. Because they are limited in length and because they must be remembered
by people with many things to remember, they are vulnerable to attack.
Basically, there are five different attacks that can be used to break a password
system. They are: try all possible passwords, try many probable words, try words likely to
be used by an individual user, try to find the system password file, and to ask the user.
Trying all the possible passwords is called the exhaustive attack or brute force
method. If given unlimited time and attempts, the user will find the right word. This
method can be frustrated by using words in excess of seven characters and using all the
letters (upper and lower case), numbers and characters on the keyboard.
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The probable password approach attempts to use common words that users are
likely to use. Because passwords are to be remembered, most people will attempt to make
one that makes sense. A random string of characters is difficult to remember, so the user
will choose a word or a group of letters that is almost a word. This narrows the universe
that the intruder needs to try and greatly increases his chance of penetration.
The next method is to identify a particular user and learn as much about him or
her as is possible. Then the intruder can build a list that the user is likely to pick a
password from, such as the name of a child, a pet, a favorite car or fiction character, or
anything else that the user favors. The smaller the list of words that the attacker needs to
try, the greater his chance of success.
Finding the system password file is a different kind of approach. If the attacker
can get any level of access to the system, he can try to find the list of passwords. This will
allow him to access anything on the system. Because the list is so powerful, the systems
administrator must take steps to protect it, such as locking the file so that only the
administrator can access it and encrypting the file so that it can not be read by the intruder
if it is discovered.
Getting the password from a user is the easiest way of penetrating the system.
Sometimes a group that works together will share their passwords to simplify the work.
This will make the work simpler, but it will also weakens security.
There are several choices that the security administrator and users can do to
enhance the security value of the passwords. This selection is provided by Pfleeger.
[PFLE89, p. 232 - 233, and RUSS91, p. 61]
(1) Use more than A-Z
(2) Choose long Passwords
(3) Avoid actual names or words
(4) Choose unlikely passwords
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(5) Change passwords regularly
(6) Dan' t write them down
( 7) Don ' t tell anyone else
The suggestion above should be stated clearly in the regulation concerning
password selection criteria.
A more sophisticated authentication system uses identifications and passwords
followed by a challenge and response interchange. The system asks different questions
each time, and must be replied to with correct answers; therefore, it is also called one-time
password. This authentication system is secure since interpretation of passwords is very
difficult. However, it is limited by the capability of people to remember the responses.
Another kind of password system uses a passphrase, which is a longer version of
a password. A passphrase consists of a number of words to form an easy to remember
phrase. Passphrase are easier for users to remember and since the are longer than
passwords they are inherently more secure. A limitation of passphrases is that they require
more memory to store.
Smart cards or tokens can eliminate need for people to remember passwords.
One example is the magnetic stripe cards used by banks for automatic teller machine
service. The disadvantage of tokens or smart cards is that they are easy to lose.
A perfect authentication system that can never be lost and has nothing to
remember uses a personal characteristic such as a fingerprint, retina pattern, or the user's
voice pattern. They give high a high level of assurance and reliability since each personal
characteristic for each person is unique. The disadvantage is that these systems are very
expensive. [PFLE89, p. 391 -392]
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5. Encryption and Decryption
Encryption and decryption are computer security methods used to make it
difficult for intruders to read any data even if they do break into the system. Encryption is
a process of encoding data and programs so that they are meaningless without the
algorithm and the key. The clear message is called plaintext, and the encrypted form is
called ciphertext. The reverse process of transforming ciphertext back into plaintext is
called decryption. [PFLE89, p.23] To ensure protection, it is important to study the
ciphertext regularly to ensure that it can not be easily decoded without the key.
There are many encryption and decryption methods, such as substitution and
permutation (transposition). In the development of codes, cryptographers work on
encryption algorithms which are hard to break; that is, they develop encryptions such that
breaking the encryption is equivalent to finding an object in a search space that has been
proven to require more than polynomial time to search (i.e., the search is NP-complete).
Presently, three encryption methods are known that are hard to break, although they are
not proved yet to fit in this category: the Merkle-Hellman knapsack encryption, the
Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) encryption, and the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
The Merkle-Hellman encryption was shown to have serious design weaknesses,
so we only discuss the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) encryption, which has remained
secure until this time and is used in some European countries, and the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) that is broadly used in the United States.
a. Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) Encryption
The RSA encryption algorithm was introduced in 1978, and remains secure
to this time. The RSA algorithm uses a solution of number theory complicated by the
difficulty of determining the prime factors of a target.
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Basically, the RSA algorithm operates with arithmetic mod n. Two keys, d
and e, are used for decryption and encryption. A key is a certain value of integer that used
to encrypt or decrypt a text, these keys only known by the sender and receiver of the
messages. The plaintext P and the ciphertext C are treated as positive integers. A plaintext
P is encrypted into a ciphertext C by
C = Pemod n
And to decrypt the ciphertext, use
P = C^mod n





Due to the symmetry property of modular arithmetic, these encryption and
decryption formulas are mutually inverse and commutative, hence:
P = Crmod n = (Pe ) dmod n = (P^fmod n
The encryption key consists of a pair of integers e and n, and the decryption
keys are d and n. To ensure that an intruder will take a very long time to break the
ciphertext, these integers should be large. First, choose n as a product of two primes p and
q which are two large prime numbers. Next, a relatively large integer e is chosen relatively
prime to (p - 1 ) * (q - 1 ). Finally, select d such that
exd = 1 mod (p- 1) x (q- I)
Choosing numbers which are large and prime increases the difficulty to
break the RSA algorithm. |PFLE89, p. 101
1
b. Data Encryption Standard (DES)
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was developed by U.S. Government for
use by the general public. It has been accepted as a cryptographic standard by the U.S and
other countries. [PFLE89, p. 106 - 121]
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By design, DES is composed of substitution and permutations (transposition).
The exploitation of these two techniques are repeated for 16 cycles, each cycle stacked on
top of the others. The plaintext is encrypted in blocks of 64 bits, the key used it is also 64
bits long although only 56 bits are needed, and it can be changed as needed. The
substitutions provide confusion by systematically substituting one bit pattern for another;
the permutations provide confusion by reordering the bits. The DES algorithm uses only
standard arithmetic and logical operations with results limited to 64 bits. Therefore, it can
be implemented in current software and also on a single-purpose integrated circuits. In fact,
several DES chips are already commercially available.
The DES algorithm starts by dividing the plaintext input into blocks of 64
bits, and then transforming them using 64 bit keys. The 64 bit input data blocks are pre-
permuted by the initial permutation, and broken into 32 bit right and left halves. Then the
following process is applied 16 times.
(1) The right half side is expanded from 32 to 48 bits by expansion
permutation; it permutes the order of the bits and repeats certain bits. This expansion has
two (2) purposes: first, to make the intermediate halves of the ciphertext comparable in size
to the key; second, to provide a longer result that can be compressed later on.
(2) The 64 bit key is cut into a 56 bit key by deletion of every 8th parity bit;
then split into 28 bits right and left side, each of them are shifted left by a number of bits
then pasted back again. After being shifted and pasted back again, the key is reduced from
56 to 48 bits by permuted choice.
(3) The 48 bit key is combined with the 48 bit expanded right half side of
ciphertext done in sub (1).
(4) The 48 bit result is divided into eight six bit blocks; each block (B.) is
operated by an S-box (Sp, which performs substitution replacing 6 bits of data with 4 bits.
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(5) The 32 bit result (eight four bit blocks) is then permuted by a straight
permutation P-box.
(6) The 32 bit permuted result is combined in X-OR functions with the 32
bit left side to perform a new right half for the next cycle.
(7) The old right half side becomes the new left half side for the new cycle.
Then the cycle is repeated fifteen times. At the end of sixteenth cycle, the
right and left half sides are pasted together, and by applying inverse initial permutation to
get the output. The same algorithm is used to decrypt the ciphertext, only the key applied
to decrypt is used in reverse order of the encryption key.
The only known weaknesses in this algorithm are weak keys and semi-weak
keys. Weak keys occur if the bits of the key are all zeroes or all ones, it does not change in
permutation and substitution; the semi-weak keys are keys with obvious patterns. For other
keys this algorithm is secure.
C. COST EFFECTIVENESS
One of the most important measures for evaluating a computer security policy is to
ensure that expenditures on security yield cost-effective benefits. Although this may seem
obvious, it is possible to be misled about where the primary effort is needed. |HOLB91, p.
10] One method used to determine cost-effective measures is risk analysis. Risk analysis
estimates how much it will cost to prevent damage or to recover from specified damage or
loss.
Pfleeger defines six (6) basic steps required for a thorough risk analysis. (PFLE89, p.
458] They are: identify assets, determine vulnerabilities, estimate likelihood of
exploitation, compute expected annual loss, survey applicable controls and their costs, and
project annual saving of control. The person performing the assessment identifies the
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assets by listing the system components, including: hardware, software, data, people,
documentation, supplies, etc. To calculate the replacement cost of software and data may
be as straightforward as finding the bill or as complicated as estimating the number of
man-hours to reproduce a study or rewrite a program. In addition to the replacement cost
the analyst must estimate the cost of disclosure, such as having a ship destroyed because
its planned route was compromised. Determining the vulnerabilities means taking into
account all the possible threats to the computer system. Some of the possible threats are
natural disasters, human vandals, unauthorized access, disclosure of information, denial of
service, etc. Of course, authorized persons have a need to access or disclose information.
Security controls must allow authorized users to access files they are authorized to use
without letting them access files or programs that exceed their authority. In the past this
was accomplished through physically separated redundant systems. It is now
technologically possible to operate a multilevel security system (MLS) that permits
multiple users, with varying clearance levels, and access abilities (also of different levels
of sensitivity) to use the same system without compromising security.
The next step is estimating the likelihood of exploitation. There are several ways to
do this: using statistical tables, observing the number of occurrences in a given amount of
time, or by group consensus. The annual loss expectancy can be calculated based on the
value of an asset and the determination of the likelihood of exploitation. Next, a survey of
applicable controls to prevent the exploitation of vulnerabilities, and a revised calculation
of annual lost expectancy is performed. This yields the cost of securing the system and
provides a measure of the cost effectiveness of the recommended controls.
D. MULTILEVEL SECURITY AS A PRIMARY PART OF SECURITY POLICY
Computer security mechanisms are needed to ensure that all information residing on
a system is protected from being lost, modified or disclosed by either malicious or careless
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users. To provide protection Russell and Gangemi define four(4) primary functions that a
computer security system should perform. |RUSS91, p. 56
1
First, to ensure that unauthorized users cannot get into the system, a system access
control is required. There are several different access control methods that can be applied,
like password systems, challenge-response systems, passphrases (longer version of
passwords), tokens or smart cards, and personal characteristics such fingerprints, retinal
patterns and voice recognition systems. Second, data access controls must define "who
can access what data and for what purpose. " Through this, the system will support the
discretionary access controls that define which other people can read or modify the data,
system files, records, fields, user permissions and program permissions. It is also possible
to use mandatory access controls, in which case the system enforces access to objects
based upon clearance levels. This is required for multilevel security. Third, system and
security administrators perform the off-line procedures to prevent possibility of breaking
the security system; for example, by clearly delineating administrator responsibilities, by
training users appropriately, and by monitoring users to make sure that security policies
are observed. The last step is taking advantage of basic hardware and software
characteristics in system design to perform appropriate protections; for example,
segmenting memory to protect between critical and noncritical data.
1. Models for Multilevel Security
Multilevel security has been modeled after the security classification system
used in the military. The military system is divided into four (4) ranks (sometimes called
classifications): unclassified, confidential, secret and top secret. In the same way, the
users' access is also defined by their ranks; for example, in the Indonesian Navy
commanding officers can access the top secret information, officers can access the secret
information, and enlisted can only access unclassified information.
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One security principle mentioned by Pfleeger [PFLE89, p. 246] is the principle
of least privilege. The principle says, a subject should have access to the fewest objects
needed for subject to work successfully. This can be explained using the military example
above; a commanding officer with permission to access a top secret rank information, is
still able to read the secret rank, confidential rank, and unclassified rank information.
Furthermore, information access is limited by the need-to-know rule: access to sensitive
data is allowed only to subjects who needs to know that data to perform their jobs.
To enforce the need-to-know restriction, the system may use the compartment
method, partitioning a rank into compartments. Users are only able to access
compartments with information relevant to their job. For example, a commanding officer
may not access all compartments in the top secret information rank, but only the part
relevant to his job.
As a result, it is possible for information to belong to more than one
compartment. For instance, a list of the foreign merchant ships that sail through the
passage way of Indonesia may be divided into compartments. For example, the Indonesian
Navy, serving as the cost guard, must patrol the passage way. The ships on patrol have
access to the complete compartment, the entire list, while other ships and activities can
only access information on a certain number of ships, or sub-compartments.
A class or classification is combination of rank and compartments. The users are
allowed to access classified information if they have certain clearances. These clearances
indicate that the users are trusted to access the information up to a certain level of
classification. Similar to the information class, the clearance of the user also defined as
combination of rank and compartment.
Recall that the user is a subject, S, and he or she wants to access to a piece of
information called an object, O. Then S can access O if:
• the clearance level of the subject S at least as high as the information O
30
the subject S has a need-to-know clearance about all information in the
compartment.
In mathematical formula the above relation can be expressed
0-l.S if and only if
rank ~< rank ~ and
compartments ^ c compartments ~
The relation < is used to limit the sensitivity of a subject that can be accessed
to an object, and the relation c indicates that the compartment of the object is the
compartment for which the subject has a need-to-know. It is known that sensitivity
requirements are hierarchical, and need-to-know requirements are nonhierarchical.
There are many models proposed for multilevel security (MLS). In this thesis
only three (3) will be described since they are used by U.S. DoD Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) for references. They are the monitor model, the
lattice model, which can be applied to military environment, and the Bell-LaPadulla
model.
a. Monitor Model
The monitor model is implemented by using gates between users, or subjects,
and objects. If a user wants to access an object, then he or she invokes the monitor
(sometimes called a reference monitor). The monitor takes the request for access and
consults the access control information. The contents of the access information file
determines if access is granted.
There are two major disadvantages to using monitors. First, if the monitor is
heavily used, it becomes bottleneck. Second, it controls only direct accesses. However, this
model is used as reference in TCSEC. [PFLE89, p. 243 - 244]
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b. Lattice Model
A lattice is a mathematical structure of elements under a relational operator.
[PFLE89, p. 248| The relation in the military model is defined through its rank, and it is
similar to the mathematical relations. In mathematical relations we use transitive and
antisymmetric properties which are defined as follows:
transitive property
if a < b and b < c then a<c
antisymmetric property
if a < b and b < a then a = b
Similar to the military example above, the transitive property is also applied
to ranking property. Every enlisted is subordinate to a petty officer, and the petty officer is
subordinate to an officer, then the officer subordinates the enlisted. Obviously, the
antisymmetric property is also applied in the military, since it is impossible that two
members of the same rank will subordinate each other.
c. Bell-LaPadulla Model
The Bell-LaPadulla model is an information flow model, which identifies
allowable paths of information flow in a secure system. One purpose of maximum
exploitation of computing machines is permitting the machines to work concurrently. It is
different from the computing devices of past years, where machines that processed
sensitive data were separated from machines that processed unclassified data. Now, a
machine should be able to operate with two (2) or more sensitivity levels together without
leakage from the higher level to the lower level.
The Bell-LaPadulla model gives two properties that are used to handle
security of data in the multiple levels. Basically, the models cover a set of subjects S and a
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set of objects O. For every subject s in 5, and object o in there is a fixed security class





A subject s may have read access to an object o only if Cu)) < C(S)
(2) Star property
A subject s who has read access to an object o may have write access to
an object/; only if C{o) < dp).
The simple security property is just like the military security model, and the star
property is used to prevent transferring a high level data by an authorized subject into a
lower level sensitivity.
2. Database Security
The majority of applications used by the Indonesian Navy involve databases
rather than dedicated system such as combat systems on warships. This is understandable
since using databases yields advantages such as shared access, minimal redundancy, data
consistency (since one changed value affects all users at once), data integrity, and
controlled access.
However, the safe exploitation of databases requires security measures such as
physical database integrity, logical database integrity, element integrity, auditability,
access control, user authentication, and availability [PFLES9, p. 304]. Some situations that
affect integrity do damage to the entire database. The element integrity refers to their
correctness or accuracy. The DBMS maintains the integrity of each item in three ways:
field checks, access control, and change log.
Auditability is desirable in order to determine who did what, and prevent
incremental access. However, maintaining an audit trail of all accesses is impractical.
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since it is slow and takes a large amount of memory. Databases are logically separated by
user access privilege. The database administrator determines who gets access to the data at
the field, record or element level; and the DBMS enforce this policy, granting or denying
access to all specified data. Usually the DBMS runs on top of O/S, which means that there
is no trusted path to the O/S, and the DBMS must be suspicious of information supplied by
the O/S, including user authentication. As a result, the DBMS must do its own
authentication. Availability should be considered as arbitration of two users' request for
the same record, and the withholding of some non-protected data to avoid revealing
protected data.
Problems in reliability and integrity can occur when modifying data. If a single
field of data is being updated, then half of the field may show old data; if multiple fields
are being updated, then no single field reflects an obvious error. To avoid these problems,
a two phase update technique is the used. In the first phase (the intent phase), the DBMS
gathers information and other resources needed to perform the update, but makes no
changes to the database. In the second phase (the commit phase), the DBMS writes a
commit flag to the database and the DBMS makes a permanent change. If the system fails
during second phase, the database may contain incomplete data, but this can be repaired
by re-performing all the activities of the second phase.
Sensitive data management is also another problem. Sensitive data is data that
should not be made public [PFLE89, p. 314]. One problem securing a database is
preventing disclosure. There are five types of disclosure: exact value of data, lower and
upper bound of them, negative result of them, existence of them and probable value of
them.
One way to obtain sensitive data is using inference; that is deriving sensitive data
from nonsensitive data. This attack can be a direct or indirect attack. Indirect attacks
consist of sum (infer a value from reported sum), count (combined with the sum to
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produce some even more revealing result), median (requires finding selections having one
point of intersection, which happens to be exactly in the middle), tracker attack (adds
additional record to be retrieved for two difference queries; the two sets cancel each other
out, leaving only the statistic desired), and linear system vulnerability (it may be possible
to determine a series of queries that returns results relating to several different sets).
There are three basic ways to control the inference problem. The first is to
suppress sensitive data values, insuring that they are not provided and rejecting the query
without a response. This may mean rejecting a request that is legitimate if answering the
request would reveal sensitive data. The second is concealing the exact value by providing
an answer that is almost correct. The third way is tracking what the user knows so that
each user that accessed a record can be identified if that record is disclosed.
Multilevel databases offer more than two levels of security, and are based upon
military security model explained previously. Multilevel databases have three
characteristics: first, the security of a single element may differ from the security of other
elements of the same record or from records with the same attributes, thus, security is
implemented for individual elements. Second, several grades of security may be needed
and may represent ranges of allowable knowledge and which may overlap; typically the
security grades form a lattice. Third, the security of an aggregate may differ from the
security of the individual elements.
3. Network Security
A computing network is a computing environment with more than one
independent processor. It is usually connected through the available communications
network [PFLE89, p. 365]. Although the communications system in Indonesia is still too
immature to support a computing network, the communications system is being upgraded
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and a computer network will be installed. To help understand how to implement network
security, a network model is described below.
a. International Standards Organization (ISO) Model
The International Standard Organization has developed a computer
communication network model called the Open System Interconnection (OS I) model
[PFLE89, p. 366]. There are seven layers in the OS I which range from the user applications
to the physical media connections.
The lowest layer is the physical layer; where the physical signal transmissions
must be compatible at the bit level. This layer is controlled by the hardware. The second
layer is the data link layer, which is also controlled by the hardware. This layer controls
communications management functions such as transmission recovery, message separation
into frames, optional encryption, headers and trailers, and error detection. The third layer
is the network layer; it is the responsibility of the network manager. Routing and blocking
messages into packets is done in this layer. The fourth layer is the transport layer; it is also
the responsibility of the network manager. Flow control, priority of service, and adding
information concerning the logical connection is controlled here. The fifth layer is the
session layer. It is the responsibility of the operating system and establishes user-to-user
sessions. Headers to show the sender, receiver and packet sequence, and recovery are added
here. The sixth layer is the presentation layer; where the system utilities break message into
blocks and compress text. Finally, the seventh layer is the application layer, which is the
responsibility of the user's program. This is where the messages that go over the network
are initiated.
b. Encryption in Networks
The vulnerable points of the computer networks are obvious. Since the
information flows through an open medium that is interceptible by the attacker, steps must
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be taken to keep him from being able to read it once he intercepts it. There are two
encryption schemes that can be used to conceal the plaintext from the intruder. They are
link encryption and end-to-end encryption.
(1) Link encryption. It is performed in the low-level protocol layers (first
and second layer). Data is encrypted just before it is placed on the physical communication
link and the encryption process is invisible to user. Encryption protects the messages as
they flow through the transmission media, but the messages are still in plaintext inside the
hosts. This means that a message is vulnerable if it passes through a host that is not secure.
It is most appropriate to use link encryption when the transmission line is the greatest point
of vulnerability.
(2) End-to-End Encryption. It is performed in the highest layers (the sixth
and seventh layers). Data is in encrypted form throughout the network and the user is
involved in the encryption process. The messages are not in plaintext inside any of the
intermediate hosts that they pass through. End-to-end encryption reduces the vulnerabilities
when a message must be passed through several hosts, any of which may be insecure. It is
most appropriate when untrusted systems may be attached to the network.
c. Port Protection
Port protection is used to prevent unauthorized access through the network
to connected computer systems. The data flowing through a network is protected by
network security which was described in the previous section. However, to prevent an
unauthorized user accessing a computer system through the network, the data ports must
be protected. The dial-in modem is an especially vulnerable point.
One kind of modem port protection is the automatic call-back. With this
device, every time a user dials into the system the computer accepts the user ID and then
breaks the phone connection. It then finds the approved phone number for that user and
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calls the user back. When an unauthorized user dials into the computer system and
identifies himself as an authorized user, the computer system will call the legitimate user
instead of the unauthorized user. The disadvantage of this kind of protection is that a user
can only dial into the computer from specific place, and special arrangements must be
made for a user traveling with a portable computer.
Another kind of protection is differentiated access rights. Differentiated
access rights limits the access to sensitive data when that access is attempted over a
modem even though the user has access over a local terminal. To access the sensitive file,
he or she must use an approved site.
Another protection is the silent modem. The silent modem does not answer
an incoming call by sending carrier tone the way that a normal modem does, it waits for
the initiating modem to send tone and then answers. In this manner, the modem does not
identify itself as being a computer system until it is convinced that it is being called by
another computer.
Finally, node authentication is used to authenticated other nodes on the
network. With this kind of authentication scheme, no node will pass traffic to another node
until that node has authenticated itself.
4. Multilevel Security Criteria
There are many kinds of multilevel security implemented differently by many of
the countries that exploit computer system as a main resource in their information sys-
tems. Some of the multilevel security evaluation criteria produced by these countries are
discussed here.
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a. U.S. DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
In 19X3 the U.S Government published the DoD Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), often referred to the "Orange Book." This book was first
reviewed and republished in 19X5, as DoD standard 5200.2X-STD. |NCSCX5. p. 7-50]
This document defines four(4) broad hierarchical divisions for the protection
of computer systems. They are: D (minimal security), C (discretionary protection), B
(mandatory protection), and A (verified protection). These broad criteria are further
refined to reflect varying degrees of security within each divisions. Higher numbers within
each divisions reflect greater security. The correct levels, in order of increasing levels of
trust are as follows: |NCSCX5, app. C and PFLEX9, p.2X4 - 2X6|
(1) Class D: Minimal Protection. This class is reserved for systems that
failed the evaluation. In fact no security characteristic is needed for this class.
(2) Class CI: Discretionary Security Protection. In this class, the minimum
standard must satisfy the discretionary access control, and be implemented by the
separation of users and data. The enforcement mechanism defined in this class specifies
access limitation to control the data and allow the users to protect their own data.
Identification and authentication are needed in this class. Users need to identify
themselves to access the system and the system protects the authentication data.
(3) Class C2: Controlled Access Protection. The discretionary access
control is enforced to a finer degree in this class than in class CI. Protection must be
implemented to the single user level. In this class the object reuse policy is implemented
so that the residue or unused object cannot be used by anyone else. In addition, an audit
trail is required for this class so that all accesses or attempted accesses can be traced back
to an individual.
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(4) Class Bl: Labelled Security Protection, The discretionary access
i ontrol and obje< l reuse is implemented in a similai fashion to the C2 class. In addition,
the requirements ol informal statement ol security policy model, data labelling and
mandatory access control ovei named subjects and objects are added. The labelling ol
exported information is required. Any Haws identified by testing musi in- removed.
<S) ('lass B2: Structured Protection, In this class the discretionary and
mandatory access control policy enforcement methods mentioned in class Hi must be
extended to all subjects and objects. The system must he divided into protection critical
and iion protection ( Mlu al sections. In addition the audit trail system, authentication
mechanism and the trusted path must be strengthened, The design specification and
implementation are subjected to extended testing and review, Covert channel analysis
must be present, Trusted facility management is provided by support for system
administration and operatoi functions, and configuration management controls are
extended, This system is relatively resistant to penetration
(6) (lass B3i Security Domains, In class in the trusted recovery must be
added lo the iec|iined elements in H.' The disc actional y access control, audit trail and
trusted path are furthei enhanced and the system must satisiy the reference monitoi
requirements rhe security functions must be tamperproof, and must be small enough for
extensive testing and analysis Significant system engineering during design and
implementation mc needed in ordei to minimize its complexity, I.e., using layering,
alvsiiae lion and inloimalion hiding. This system is highly icsislanl to penetration,
(/) ('lass A I Verified Design. In class Al, trusted distribution is added.
Systems In tins class are functional equivalents of the systems in class B3. The formal
model design specification and verification in tins system will result in u high degree of
assurance, This system requires formal analysis *>' coven channels,
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The "Orange Book" is recognized as first document to define multilevel
security, and many countries have developed their evaluation criteria based on this book
b. The Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC)
The Canadian government recently established the Canadian Trusted
Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), however the complete document has
not been published yet. Basically, this document is explained as the Canadian
interpretation of U.S. DoD 5200.28-STD (TCSEC). [CSSC91, p. xi]
The document is divided into five (5) categories or levels; Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability, Accountability and Assurance. Compared to the "Orange Book,"
which is divide into four (4) groups or requirements: security policy, accountability,
assurance, and documentation, CTCPEC addresses one of the criticisms of the "Orange
Book." CTCPEC adds the area of insuring availability as a major component of computer
security. The deeper levels of availability are not yet defined since this document is still in
development.
Each category is split into classes and, similar to TCSEC, each of them is
refined into varying levels. Confidentiality is split into four (4) classes: Discretionary
(CD), Mandatory (CM), Partitions (CP) and Object Reuse (CR). Depending on the range,
each class has a range level indicated by a number behind it, for example CD-I is
Confidentiality/Discretionary Protection level one (1). The range level varies for every
class depending on the hierarchical base.
Compared to the groups of requirements in "Orange Book", the three classes
in CTCPEC which are discretionary, mandatory and object reuse are interpretations of the
security policy in the "Orange Book." The partitions class describes the compartments
which address the labelling system in the security policy of the "Orange Book".
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As with Confidentiality, Integrity is split into three (3) distinct classes:
Discretionary Protection (Id), Mandatory Protection (IM), and Separation of Duties (IS);
and each class has range levels. The basic structure of the integrity criteria is expected to
follow that of the confidentiality criteria.
Furthermore, Accountability (describing "who") is split into 3 distinct
classes: Identification and Authentication (WI), Audit (WA), and Trusted Path (WT).
These criteria are drawn directly from the "Orange Book".
Finally, Assurance (another word for "trust") is one (1 ) class, and covers the
range of: Operational Trust (TO), Life Cycle Trust (TL), and Documentation (TD). The
assurance criteria are used to establish the degree to which evidential support and
subsequent reasoning exists about how the chosen product's mechanisms and design will
support the specified product security policy, throughout the life of the product. These
assurance criteria are directly extracted from the TCSEC.
c. European Community Advisory Group Information Technology Security
Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
The European Community advisory group developed the Information
Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), published in 1992. Currently, this book is known as
"Europe's White Book." This book harmonized the criteria of France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Like the CTCPEC, this book also frequently
referenced the U.S. TCSEC. In addition to the "White Book", the German Information
Security Agency (Zentralstelle fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) published
Criteria for the Evaluation of trustworthiness of Information Systems in July 1989. At the
same time France developed the same criteria in the so-called "Blue-White-Red Book"
(SCSSI). The U.K. also produce a similar criteria for security evaluation.|SOGI91, p. 9]
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Basically the criteria define ten (10) distinct classes of security functionality
which is based upon classes defined in the German National criteria, and seven (7) distinct
classes of Assurance. | DITT9 1 , p.269 and RUSS9 1 , p. 3 1 9-32 1
1
The ten (10) classes of security functionality are:
(1) Fl: Discretionary Security Protection. This class is derived from
"Orange Book" class CI.
(2) F2: Controlled Access Protection. This class is derived from "Orange
Book" class C2.
(3) F3: Labelled Security Protection. This class is derived from "Orange
Book" class Bl.
(4) F4: Structured protection. This class is derived from "Orange Book"
class B2.
(5) F5: Security Domains. This class is derived from "Orange Book" class
B3/A 1
.
(6) F6: High Integrity for data and programs. A distinct class for systems
with high integrity (in contrast to confidentiality) requirements for data and programs. It's
particularly appropriate for database systems.
(7) F7: High Availability. A distinct class for systems with high standards
for either a complete system or a special function of a system. It's particularly appropriate
for process control systems.
(8) F8: High Integrity during data communication. A distinct class for
systems with high standards for safeguarding data integrity during data communication.
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(9) F9: High confidentiality during data communication. A distinct class
for systems with high standards of confidentiality of data during data communication. It's
particularly appropriate for cryptographic systems.
(10) F10: Networks with high demands on confidentiality and integrity. A
distinct class for networks with high demands for the confidentiality and integrity of the
information to be communicated. It's particularly appropriate when sensitive information
needs to be communicated over insecure (e.g., public) networks.
And the seven (7) assurance levels are:
( 1
)
EO: Inadequate confidence. Roughly equivalent to "Orange Book" class
D assurance.
(2) El: Tested. Roughly equivalent to "Orange Book" class CI assurance.
(3) E2: Configuration control and controlled distribution. Roughly
equivalent to "Orange Book" class C2 assurance.
(4) E3: Access to detailed design and source code. Roughly equivalent to
"Orange Book" class Bl assurance.
(5) E4: Rigorous vulnerability analysis. Roughly equivalent to "Orange
Book" class B2 assurance.
(6) E5: Demonstrates correspondence between detailed design and source
code. Roughly equivalent to "Orange Book" class B3 assurance.
(7) E6: Formal models and formal descriptions, linked by formal
correspondences. Roughly equivalent to "Orange Book" class Al assurance.
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d. U.K Technical Criteria for Security Evaluation
The U.K also developed the Technical Criteria for Security Evaluation
which was published in February 19X9. [DITT91, p. 26X] This document specifies
security functionality in two complementary ways:
(1) Security Prerequisites define a set of axiomatic statements about the
properties required of a system to provide for maintenance.
(2) Claims Language defines a language that is used to describe the
features in a form suitable for use as a standard for evaluation.
The Security prerequisites are categorized in two types: Security controls
which are enforceable (XI to X6), and Security objectives that are not enforceable ( Yl to
Y5).




(4) X4: Object Protection
(5) X5: Object Reuse
(6) X6: No Repudiation
And security objectives that are not enforceable are:
(1) Yl: No Addition
(2) Y2: No Loss
(3) Y3: Confinement
(4) Y4: Timeliness
(5) Y5: No Denial of Resources
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A table inside this document is used to match the security claim phrase
which is satisfied by each security prerequisites. From this, a matching evaluation level
can be found as level from LI to L6.
5. The Need for Multilevel Security
In the previous section, one method to ensure that computer system security
works perfectly is data access control. The best known way to implement it is the
multilevel security model. Multilevel security data bases require two or more levels of
security for both the data elements and the users of one data base. [PFLEX9, p. 329) Data
in the system is segmented into parts that have their own classification, every user in this
system also has his own level that indicates permission to access data. One example is the
United States military security model. Every user in the system has a level of security, and
the file has a level. The level of the user defines what kind of data level can be accessed.
Subsection one (1) in this section described how the military models work.
If the Indonesian Navy is to complete every mission and task, it must continue to
develop its information technology. Computers and communication networks move
information around at the speed of light. The Navy began moving into the information age
more that ten years ago with a stand-alone computer. They are now upgrading the
communications infrastructure to support local and wide area networks.
Multilevel security offers the Navy the opportunity to protect the nation's secrets
while keeping up with the demands for speed and reduced costs.
E. SUMMARY
The first problem in implementing a computer security system is identifying the
threats to the computer system. This chapter described several threats to computer
security; threats to the physical system, to the software, and to the data. The threats were
also divided into internal or external threats. These threats are due to the system integrity,
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privacy. Several controls to protect against these threats are also described in this chapter,
as well as an approach to determining cost effectiveness. The next chapter reviews the
current policies of the Indonesian Navy regarding computer security.
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III. REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OE THE CURRENT COMPUTER
SECURITY POLICY OF THE INDONESIAN NAVY
A. THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS USED BY THE INDONESIAN NAVY
The first computers procured by the Indonesian Navy were analog computers that
were installed on war ships to calculate gun trajectories and control existing weapon
systems. These computers controlled mechanical linkages and gears. The software was
not susceptible to viruses because it was not able to generate corrupted copies of itself or
other software. The only computer security required was physical security.
In the early I970's the Indonesian Navy developed an information center to support
more sophisticated general-purpose digital computers. The first system installed in the
center was an International Business Machine (IBM) mainframe model 370. The primary
uses were administrative, personnel management and payroll functions. Because of the
centralized design and operation of early mainframe computers, security needs were
limited to personnel security and physical security.
In the late 1970's the Indonesian Navy continued the modernization program by
purchasing new ships. These ships were built and outfitted in Europe and included modern
digital computerized weapon-control systems. These computer systems were built by
HSA Holland, a subsidiary of Philips. The software used in this system was written or
modified by HSA Holland at the time of manufacture and in accordance with the
Indonesian Navy's specifications. Because of the real-time processing requirement, the
systems were all coded in assembly language.
To promote standardization, the next order of ships used the same fire-control
systems. To support these ships, the Navy expanded the computer center. They added a
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) VAX- 11/750 running VAX/VMS. The software
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and hardware have been upgraded as needed and other facilities have been added, as the
center outgrew its original building. At this point in the center's development, the
computer systems were still isolated and physical and personnel security were all that was
required.
The next step in the Navy's use of computers was the introduction of personal
desktop systems to further support administrative and logistics functions. Because of
Indonesia's poor quality telephone lines, the computers still operated in a stand-alone
manner.
Now the Navy intends to install local-area networks as the first phase of a program to
develope a data-communications network that will connect all the computer systems. This
will greatly complicate the security requirements.
B. CURRENT POLICIES AND STANDARDS IN THE INDONESIAN NAVY
Naval Chief of Staff Regulation No. JUKNIK/6/VI/X1, dated 20 June 19X1, is the
current regulation that establishes standards of information systems.
The regulation is a combination of reference material that was supplied by the
manufacturers of the Navy's systems and literature that was found in other countries. The
regulation focused on personnel threats from inside the organization because there were
no known attempts at unauthorized access by hackers or spies. Threats to the data were
perceived to come from the computer center personnel and were compensated for by
organizational structure. Threats from outside the computer centers were nullified with
physical security such as guards and locks.
Regulation No. JUKNIK/6/VI/81 defines four organizational responsibilities for







4. Planning and operating security
In addition to the organizational responsibilities, there is great emphasis that every
user is personally responsible for securing information.
1. Personnel Security
Personnel security requires that each person with access to a computer system
must have a security clearance with a prescribed level of access. That person may then use
the files that are at or below his or her access level. Prior to using a file with a higher
access level, he or she must be granted clearance by the information security
administrator. Even government officials are required to be granted access before being
allowed to have the information in a computerized file. This restriction extends to the
maintenance personnel. Maintenance personnel will either have a clearance and access to
the highest level of information stored on the machine or they will be supervised at all
times by personnel that do have the appropriate clearance and access.
2. Physical Security
The physical security requirements are the most precise because the threats are
the most obvious and most predictable. The effect of natural disasters such as floods,
storms, and fires can be predicted and mitigated through site location and construction
standards, and this regulation has stated the common equipment and backups to be used
against them.
Computer network security is also discussed in a global and theoretical manner,
since the network itself was not completed at the time the regulation was written.
Document security stresses the destruction of paper products and does not adequately
address the control and destruction of electronic media such as disks and tape or electronic
messages such as E-mail and electronically transferred files.
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3. System Development
The section on system development addresses the need for standard procedures
and documentation. Every program file should be validated and verified before it is
accepted for use on the system. To record faults in the operation of the computer system
the regulation specifies a log book or journal. The use of an automated journal that would
automatically record discrepancies and report them to the system administrator and
security administrator is not discussed. Therefore, the effectiveness of the recording and
reporting system rely almost completely on the human operators. Individual ethics,
morality and dependability are the major components of this critical reporting system.
4. Planning and Operating Security
The section concerning planning and operating system security specifies the
required plans and procedures to ensure the secure use of the system. This includes
instructions for authenticating and validating source data before entering it into the
computer system. The use of cryptographic devices for protecting communications and
data and the requirements for security checks of the communications channels are in this
section. Also included are requirements for equipment layouts to ensure such things as the
placement of terminals to prevent viewing by unauthorized personnel.
System security includes file access, hardware integrity, and software integrity.
File access is controlled by passwords, badge reading, assigning file attributes such as
read, write and execute to each individual, and even by limiting access to certain files to
specific terminal addresses. The regulation specifies regular and as-needed changes of
passwords and badges to maintain security.
Maintaining hardware integrity is essential for the secure operation of a
computer system. The regulation mentions several methods for ensuring aspects of
hardware integrity. They include read after write, parity checks, check sums, check digits.
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hash and counts, and sequence numbers. All these methods will verify some aspect of
system integrity. But along with adding to the cost of the computer system, security
devices in the hardware impact the computer performance. [LANE85, p. 55 1 There is very
little discussion in the regulation of how to determine the effective trade-off between cost,
performance, and security.
This section also lists several requirements to insure software integrity, but it is
very unclear what the original author or authors were trying to accomplish. The regulation
states that violations of software integrity can be detected by observing the file number
and by automatically verifying the programs code. Unauthorized variations in the code or
the file number indicate a violation. The program must be prevented from losing,
corrupting, or copying data. The operating system must be capable of controlling the data
transfer between the processor and on-line devices, fully protect the memory, and be able
to interrupt system and peripheral devices as needed. It should also be able to limit access
of maintenance personnel to authorized levels and procedures. And the erasure of
classified information must be conducted and verified in such a manner that there is no
residue. This section must be rewritten to clarify the instructions as well as to reflect
current technology.
5. Personal Responsibility
Finally, the regulation stresses the individual user's responsibilities concerning
information security. These responsibilities are stressed as an ethical issue instead of a
regulatory issue. Security depends on every person who uses the information bearing in
mind that the information is to be used for the good of all Indonesians. When that occurs,
all are aware of the meaning of security and how important it is.
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C. THE POLICY NEEDS TO BE UPDATED
There are many reasons that the polices and standards now used by the Indonesian
Navy need to be updated. The most obvious reason is that technology has changed so
much. Since Regulation No. JUKNIK/6/VI/X1 was written in 19X1, the regulation has
become obsolete. The techniques of hackers, crackers and spies have kept pace with the
advances in technology and the Navy will be vulnerable until its security regulations and
security programs recognize and deal with these threats. Several matters that are
inadequately addressed or not addressed at all are:
1. The Proliferation Of Viruses, Trojan Horses, And Worms
There is no definite time when the term computer virus was coined, but the day
when Dr. Frederick Cohen published his thesis about computer viruses (19X4), seems to
mark the first published reference. At least his thesis marks the time when the treat of
viruses began to be explored by computer scientists. Since the regulation was written three
years before Dr. Cohen's thesis, the work on this kind of program sabotage needs to be
included.
2. Powerful Personal Computers Are Becoming Widely Available
With the proliferation of powerful personal computers available at modest
prices, it is becoming more common for professionals to have a computer to work on at
home. Since these computers are not subject to the same protections as the ones in the
office, they can be the source of infections and attacks. The regulation must deal with
persons moving files between their systems at home and their systems at the office.
3. Networked And Distributed Processing Systems
As the telecommunications systems are improved, computer networks and
distributed computing systems will become more prevalent. Because the number of entry
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points for an attacker is increased, the controls are harder to implement. A major problem
for commanders and administrators is that for the first time terminals and systems that can
be the source of an attack on their systems are not under their control. Thus, for them to
have confidence in their security, they must believe that all systems security on the
network is the same. This is easiest to accomplish by placing the requirements in a
regulation that applies to all organizations on the network.
4. Rapid Technological Development
The technology of computer security has developed quite rapidly in
industrialized nations as a result of miscellaneous attacks on their systems. Indonesia, as a
developing country, can be a purchaser of much of this computer security technology.
Security regulations must make provisions for the on-going review of technological
developments and their insertion into the Navy's systems.
5. Increasing Reliance On Computer Systems For National Security
The primary task of the Indonesian Navy is defense of Indonesia from possible
attacks. Because the Navy is relying more and more on computer systems to accomplish
its missions, the effect of a successful attack on the computer systems is becoming ever
more serious. The regulation must provide guidance to all levels of administration for
protecting against this threat.
6. Multi Level Security (MLS)
Regulation No JUKNIK/6/VI/81 was written prior to the public discussion of
multilevel security (MLS), so it does not include any reference to the concept. MLS has
many advantages in terms of cost savings and reduced overhead. Because all information
can exist on one system regardless of security classification, redundant systems do not have
to be purchased, installed and administered. Databases do not have to be replicated and
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maintained on multiple systems and more efficient use can be made of all equipment. The
potential savings are immense. MLS will be an important component of the next security
regulation.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed the current computer security policy of the Indonesian Navy
which is implemented in Naval Chief of Staff Regulation No. JUKNIK/6/VI/X1, dated 20
June 19X1. The regulation codifies the policy governing computer security in the late
seventies. Due to advances in computer technology, the infrastructure that supports it, and
our growing reliance on computer systems, new policies are needed to ensure that those
systems are available when we want to use them. The next chapter proposes changes to
Indonesia's existing policies to reflect current technological advance.
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IV. POLICY FOR THE INDONESIAN NAVY
Having studied the foundational concepts of computer security and reviewing the
existing regulations about computer security in the Indonesian Navy, we can now
determine what actions are required to improve the policy that is already in place.
A. THE NEED FOR A COMPUTER SECURITY POLICY
The goal of developing a policy on computer security is to define the organization's
expectations of proper computer and network use and to define procedures to prevent and
respond to security incidents. In order to do this, aspects of the particular organization
should be considered.
Since this policy is developed for the Indonesian Navy, the organizational goals
concern the safety and unity of the whole nation. To achieve these goals of national
security, computer security must be a top priority of all users of computer systems.
However, not all information in the Indonesian Navy can be considered top secret, some of
it may be secret, confidential or even unclassified. Thus, the most effective system to have
is a multilevel security (MLS) system.
However, since the implementation of a multilevel security system is costly, and since
some systems now owned by the Indonesian Navy are still useful, the policy must address
an evaluation criteria that evaluates existing as well as proposed systems. In this manner,
the machines that fail the evaluation for processing a certain classification of information
may still be used to process information at a lower classification.
The second function of the evaluation criteria will be to assess the suitability of
proposed equipment. Using the criteria will aide the security and acquisition personnel
insure that new systems and components support the approved security architecture.
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1. Policy Maker Responsibility
Policy creation must be a joint effort by technical personnel, who understand the
full ramifications of the proposed policy and the implementation of the policy, and the
decision makers who have the power to enforce the policy. A policy that is neither
implementable nor enforceable is useless.
In the Indonesian Navy, the policy should be established by the joint effort of the
Naval Data Collection and Information System, Naval Telecommunication and Electronic
Directorate, Naval Sensor, Weapon and Command Directorate as the technical personnel,
and Naval Security Directorate, and Naval Operation Directorate as the decision maker
who enforce the policy.
Furthermore, the directorates mentioned above will have their own
responsibilities in the security organization form for computer system.
2. Evaluation Criteria as the First Step
Chapter III described some of the old models of computer systems adopted by
the Indonesian Navy. As a developing country, establishing a new system by discarding
an existing system is a very costly action, especially if computer production is dependent
on a foreign country.
To avoid spending money for replacing every computing system with new
equipment to exactly implement the multilevel security, the existing equipment may be
used for a lower classification of information. An evaluation criteria is needed in order to
define the classification of existing equipment. Certain levels of information may be kept
or processed on these older systems based on the classification of the equipment.
In addition, this evaluation guide will be used to develop a new system or
purchase an available system to be used by the Navy to support any tasks that are suitable
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tor automation. It is clear that the Navy needs a new guide. The next task is to choose the
published criteria that is the most applicable to the Navy's requirements.
B. THE NEEDS OF THE INDONESIAN NAVY
The first published criteria for evaluating multilevel security systems is the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria developed by the U.S. Government. Using this guide
as a baseline, other countries developed evaluation criteria of their own. They are Canada,
Germany, the U.K., the Netherlands, France, Australia and New Zealand. Germany, the
U.K., the Netherlands and France went on to develop a harmonized criteria for the
European Community.
1. Criteria for the Indonesian Navy
Indonesia needs to have an evaluation criteria for the computer systems that are
already installed as well as those that they will procure in the future. The Indonesian
Navy, as a military organization, exploits computer systems to support its operations.
Since the Navy is a complex organization with different classification levels of
information, they will benefit from a multilevel security criteria.
The Indonesian Navy imports all of the hardware and software that it uses. As a
consequence, the criteria they adopt should match the machines being imported. The
mainframe computer systems are mainly imported from the U.S., and personal computers
are imported from Asian countries. So, it is important that the first evaluation criteria
should refer to the U.S. products. In other words, they should adopt a policy based on the
"Orange Book."
However, the "Orange Book" from the U.S. Government must be supported by
the rainbow series, which is too large and complicated to be adopted by the Navy at this
time. Currently, the information technology and the infrastructure possessed by the
Indonesian Navy does not require this complicated approach.
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The ITSEC from European Community are not straight-forward evaluation
criteria, but depend on the technical judgements of experts in each country. This occurred
because the ITSEC is a harmonized criteria from several countries in Europe. This would
be difficult for the Indonesian Navy to adopt because they do not have the experts to
interpret the ITSEC.
The Canadian Government directly interprets the "Orange Book" in the
Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria. It is a simple publication and,
with small modifications, can be adapted to the Indonesian Navy.
The purposes of the recommended Trusted Evaluation Guide (TEG) which is
adapted from Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria are:
a. Measurement
To provide Indonesian Navy with a metric with which to evaluate the degree
of trust that can be placed in computer products used for processing of sensitive
information.
b. Guidance
To provide a guide to contractors/manufacturers as to what security features
to build into their new and planned, commercial products in order to produce widely
available products that satisfy trust requirements for sensitive applications.
In Chapter II it was noted that the Canadian Trusted Computer Product
Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) is divided into five categories or levels; Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability, Accountability and Assurance. The recommended Trusted
Evaluation Guide is also divided in the same way; a detailed description of each of these
areas can be found in section D of the appendix.
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Since many documents refer to. the U.S. Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC), it is useful to provide a mapping of the classes found in the




































































































From this mapping, it is clear that there is a close correspondence between the
proposed Trusted Evaluation Guide (TEG) and the U.S. TCSEC, which may aid in
performing cost effective evaluations of systems.
2. Security Organization
It was mentioned in Chapter II that individual users play the primary role in
information security. However, there is a need for a formal executive body that is
responsible for the computer security organization. In the Indonesian Navy, existing
executive bodies may be assigned additional responsibilities concerning computer
security.
The Naval Data Collection and Information System, as the incubator for
information systems in the Navy, will be given the main responsibility for securing
information systems. It will also act as the administrator that executes the regulation
concerning computer systems. This body has the Navy's experts in computer technology.
The Naval Telecommunication and Electronic Directorate will be responsible for
securing the computer network. In this body there is a special section that works with the
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encryption and decryption techniques. With this experience, it can direct the use of
encryption and decryption in the computer systems.
The Naval Sensor, Weapon, and Command Directorate is responsible for the
combat information systems on board the ships. This information concerns combat
information and is considered top secret. This body must clearly understand the value of
information, and how to secure it.
All the organizations listed above have responsibilities in the technical areas of
computer security. In order to enforce the security regulations, the executive body, which
has the power to enforce the regulations, must be involved.
The Naval Security Directorate has primary responsibility in all aspects of
security in the Navy. Therefore, it has responsibility for computer security as well. It will
inspect the implementation of security in all of the Naval organizations that possess
computer systems. This directorate needs to create a section with the primary
responsibility for computer security policy and inspections.
The Naval Operations Directorate, as the top management level, has the power
and responsibility to see that the security regulation is implemented thoroughly.
C. SUMMARY
An effective computer security policy supports the goals and missions of the
organization. The goals and missions of the Indonesian Navy is nothing less than
preserving the security and unity of Indonesia. Computer systems will continue to grow in
importance as a tool for accomplishing those missions. An effective security evaluation
program is essential to guarantee that the tool will be available when needed. The criteria
to support such a program was laid out in this chapter. The next chapter contains the
recommendations to implement an effective security program.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Having studied the concept of ideal computer security and reviewed what has been
done by the Indonesian Navy, it is obvious that the computer security regulation needs to
be updated. This is especially true for the sections dealing with physical and
communications security as well as data security, integrity and availability.
There are several actions that the Indonesian Navy needs to take to improve its
computer security posture. Some actions should be taken immediately, some policies and
procedures will take 12 to IX months to develop and implement, while others will take
many years. These recommendations are explained below.
A. REGULATIONS CONCERNING PHYSICAL SECURITY
There is a need to more clearly state the security requirements in Regulation No.
JUKNIK/6/VI/X1. The advanced technology available today can be applied to the physical
security of computer systems. The amount and sophistication of the technology used
should be balanced by the amount and value of the information in the system. For
example, to protect an area where top secret information is processed may require
sophisticated authentication devices such a magnetic stripe cards or a retinal pattern
reader.
B. REGULATIONS CONCERNING DATA SECURITY, INTEGRITY AND
AVAILABILITY
The regulations concerning data security need to be updated to reflect the
developments in information technology. The networked and distributed computing
systems are already being installed in the headquarters, starting with a local area network.
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Obviously, with this development, the threats to data security, integrity and availability
become greater. The regulation should be clearly written to cover these increased threats.
Regulations concerning virus protection also need to be written, since the Regulation
No. JUKNIK/6/VI/K1 was written before viruses were known. This is very important
since the environment in Indonesia is so favorable for spreading viruses from one
computer to another.
The Indonesian Navy needs to protect its systems with antivirus programs and
procedures. The programs need to be updated regularly, because new and more
sophisticated viruses are being developed all the time. A connection with an antivirus
software manufacturer is recommended, so that, every product update is immediately
available.
Until then, messages should be sent to all organizations using computer systems
prohibiting disks that were used on nongovernment computers from being used on
government computers.
C. RECOMMENDED TRUSTED EVALUATION GUIDE
As a military organization that has several degrees of information sensitivity, the
Indonesian Navy needs to implement multilevel security (MLS), in certain critical areas
that deal with classified information.
The recommended Trusted Evaluation Guide proposed for the Indonesian Navy in
the appendix is adapted from the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria
(CTCPEC) with minor modifications. This is because the CTCPEC is such a clear and
simplified interpretation of the "Orange Book." The "Orange Book" requires the entire
rainbow series, which is more than the Indonesian Navy requires at this time.
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1. Intermediate Actions
The evaluation guide proposed in this thesis is not yet complete. The chapter
covering data availability still needs to be written in order to have a complete definition of
security. Furthermore, this evaluation needs to be expand in scope so that products from all
over the world can be evaluated, since Indonesia may import systems from all over the
world.
When the evaluation guide is completed and adopted, a trusted computing
architecture must be developed that will guide all computer purchases for the Navy.
All communications links will be analyzed and prioritized by risk, and the most
vulnerable links will be encrypted and funds are make available.
2. Long Term Actions
The evaluation guide should be automated so that it will accelerate and simplify
evaluations. A software system that accepts characteristic values of a system and
automatically produces the required classification based on the evaluation guide will
produce consistent results very quickly. This will increase use of the evaluation criteria and
possibly reduce the time it will take to achieve a trusted network. In a nonautomated system
for conducting evaluations, several highly skilled individuals are required. Automation is
highly recommended since the Indonesian Navy currently possesses few experts with the
required skills to perform evaluations.
In addition, the U.S. Federal Government together with Canadian Government
are developing joint standards in evaluating a computer products. These actions may be
followed by harmonization with European countries. The proposed Trusted Evaluation
Guide positions Indonesia to participate in these efforts.
As trusted systems and components are procured, they will replace the untrusted
systems currently in use.This will strengthen the entire security posture of the Indonesian
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Navy. But, empirical and validation studies that measure the effect of the statements in the
evaluation guide is needed.
D. SUMMARY
Taking these steps will enable the Navy to plug many of the most dangerous holes
immediately, design a balanced security program in the near future, and build a trusted
multilevel computing environment over time. In the end, the Indonesian Navy will have a




RECOMMENDED TRUSTED EVALUATION GUIDE
INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The criteria presented in this document are based on the U.S. Department of Defense
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (DoD 5200.28-STD) which evolved from
the earlier NIST, and MITRE evaluation material.
B. SCOPE
The trusted computer product evaluation criteria defined in this document apply
primarily to trusted, commercially available electronic data processing (EDP) products.
Included are two distinct sets of requirements:
I. Specific Security Feature Requirements
The specific feature requirements encompass the capabilities typically found in
information processing products employing general-purpose operating systems that are
distinct from application programs being supported. However, specific security feature
requirements may also apply to specific products with their own functional requirements,
applications or special environments (e.g. communications processors, process control
computers, and embedded products in general).
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2. Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements, on the other hand, apply to products that cover the
full range of computing environments from dedicated controllers to full range multilevel
secure resource sharing products.
C. PURPOSE
The criteria have been developed to serve a number of intended purposes:
1. To provide the Indonesian Navy with a metric with which to evaluate the degree
of trust that can be placed in computer products used for the processing of sensitive
information; and
2. To provide a guide to manufacturers as to what security features to build into
their new and planned, commercial products in order to produce widely available products
that satisfy trust requirements for sensitive applications.
With respect to the first purpose for the development of criteria, i.e., providing the
Indonesian Navy with a security evaluation scale, evaluations can be delineated into two
types:
1. An evaluation can be performed on a computer product from a perspective that
excludes consideration of a specific application environment.
2. An assessment can be done to determine whether appropriate security measures
have been taken or can be taken to permit the product to be used operationally in a specific
application environment. This type of evaluation is more commonly known as a risk
assessment.
It must be understood that the completion of the first type of evaluation, i.e., a formal
product evaluation under the Trusted Product Evaluation Program, does not constitute
certification approval for the product to be used in any specific application environment.
The evaluation report only provides a trusted computer product's strengths and
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weaknesses from a computer security point of view. A risk assessment and the formal
approval, done in accordance with the applicable policies of the Indonesian Navy and of
the institution(s) which intend to use the product, must still be followed before a product
can be approved for use in processing or handling classified information in a particular
application. Directorate Security remains ultimately responsible for specifying the
security requirements for their respective EDP systems.
The trusted computer product evaluation criteria will be used directly and indirectly
in the certification and approval processes. The criteria will be used directly as technical
guidance for evaluation of a product being considered for certification and for specifying
certification requirements for such a product. Where a candidate product being evaluated
for certification employs, as a subsystem, another product that has already undergone an
evaluation under the Trusted Product evaluation Program, reports from the evaluation of
the subsystem will be used as input to the evaluation of the candidate product. The criteria
will be used indirectly, as reference, during the risk assessment process.
Technical data will be furnished to designers, evaluators and Directorate Security to
support their needs for making decisions.
D. FUNDAMENTAL COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Any discussion of computer security necessarily starts from a statement of
requirements, i.e., what really means to call a computer product "secure". In general, a
secure product will control, through use of specific security features, access to information
within the control of the product such that only properly authorized individuals, or
processes operating on their behalf, will have access to read, write, create, or delete
information. Figure 1 graphically illustrated the basic thought of the basic structure of a
"secure" system. Six fundamental requirements are derived from this basic statement
objective: four deal with what needs to be provided to control access to information; and
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two deal with how one can obtain credible assurances that this is accomplished in a trusted
computer product.
Figure 1 View of a Secure System
1. Subjects, objects, and Processes as "'Entities"
Unlike the traditional view of subjects and objects espoused by the NCSC, this
Recommended Trusted Evaluation Guide's view of each is isomorphic.
To view each entity one must view it from the perspective of the TCB. In this way
one can see that each entity is an entity with at least the following attributes:
a. Name
What is the name of the entity (i.e., user ID, name of file, etc.)
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b. Label
Designated level of operation. This is set at login time for subjects, and
known for processes and objects.
c. Multilevel
Is the entity capable of multilevel access?
d. Discretionary Access Restrictions
What are the discretionary access restrictions to the entity?
e. Duty list
What are the entity's predefined duties?
This creates an isomorphic set of entities (Subject (User), Process, Data
(Object)) which are accessed in an orthogonal way.The methods of access for objects are
identical to those for subjects and processes. This allows for users to be viewed as
multilevel devices as are most input/output devices. Also, a user would log in with a
specific label associated with himself. This label would, to the TCB, look identical to
labels associated with various objects and process throughout the system.
2. Security Policy
There must be an explicit security policy enforced by the product. This policy
would consist at least one of: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. A
level of assurance would be determined relative to the strength of the mechanisms within
the product enforcing the security policy.
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3. Confidentiality
a. Requirement 1 : Discretion
Given identified subjects and objects, there must be a set of rules that are
used by the product to determine whether a given subject can be permitted to gain access
to a specific object.
b. Requirement 2: Compartmentalization
Given well defined compartments, be they hierarchical or not, the product
must be able to determine the compartment at which the subject is working and the level
of the object to which the subject wishes access and authorize (or not) access to the object
according to the defined security policy of the product.
c. Requirement 3: Marking
Confidentiality labels must be associated with objects. In order to control
operations on access to information stored in a computer, according to the rules of a
mandatory security policy, it must be possible to mark every object with a label that
reliably identifies the object's sensitivity level (e.g. classification, area of work, etc.) and/
or the process authorization accorded those subjects who may potentially access the
object.
4. Integrity
a. Requirement 4: Separation of Duties
Given well defined duties, the product shall ensure that any subject's attempt
to access an object is properly authorized as defined by the security policy. Any attempt to
access an object other than by a known path will be disallowed and appropriately
recorded.
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5. Availability (Not Yet Complete)
6. Accountability
a. Requirement 5: Identification
Individual subjects must be identified. Each access to information must be
mediated based on who is accessing the information and what classes of information they
are authorized to deal with. This identification and authorization information must be
securely maintained by the computer product and be associated with every active element
that performs some security-relevant action in the product.
b. Requirement 6: Accountability
Audit information must be selectively kept and protected so that portions of
the audit record reflecting a security breach can be used to track down the responsibility
party. A trusted product must be able to record the occurrences of security-relevant events
in an audit log. The capability to select the audit events to be recorded is necessary to
minimize the expense of auditing and to allow efficient analysis. Audit data must be
protected from modification and unauthorized destruction to permit detection and after-
the -fact investigations of security violations.
7. Assurance
a. Requirement 7: Assurance
The computer product must contain hardware/software mechanisms that can
be independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance that the product enforces
requirements one through six above. In order to assure that the six requirements of
Security Policy, Marking, Identification, and Accountability are enforced by a computer
product, there must be some identified and unified collection of hardware and software
controls that perform those functions. These mechanisms are typically embedded in the
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operating system and are designed to carry out the assigned tasks in a secure manner. The
basis for trusting such product mechanisms in their operational setting must be clearly
documented such that it is possible to independently examine the evidence to evaluate
their sufficiency.
b. Requirement 8: Continuous Protection
The trusted mechanisms that enforce these fundamental requirements must
be continuously protected against tampering and/or unauthorized changes. No computer
product can be considered truly secure if the basic hardware and software mechanisms
that enforce the security policy are themselves subject to unauthorized modification or
subversion. The continuous protection requirement has direct implications throughout the
computer product's life-cycle.
E. STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT
This document is divided into six parts. The first part covers the introduction, and the
following five parts present the detailed criteria which relate to the fundamental
requirements described above.
F. STRUCTURE OF THE CRITERIA
The criteria are divided into five categories: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Accountability, and Assurance. Each category contains classes which are generally
ordered in a hierarchical manner with the highest division being reserved for products
providing the most comprehensive security features. Each division and class represents a
major improvement in the features or assurance one can place in the product for the
protection of sensitive information.
As improvements in the features are exposed within each of the five categories a level
is assigned. This level, increases as the features increase. Each category is numbered
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following a logical and linear path commencing at zero (0) and working upwards. Readers
should not make the mistake of assuming that the levels of one category directly correlate
to those of another. Although two levels within two distinct categories may be numbered
the same they do not necessarily define a classification hierarchy. If one views the
document as a set of five distinct criteria which are coupled by way of a constraint, one
will have a better understanding of the structure. The breadth of Levels found within each
category is defined below:
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is split into four distinct classes: Discretionary,
Mandatory, Partitions, and Object Reuse. Each of these Classes
have a range of levels:
Confidentiality/Discretionary Protection: CD - CD 3
Confidentiality/Mandatory Protection: CM - CM 3
Confidentiality/Partitions: CP - CP 4
Confidentiality/Object Re-use: CR - CR 1
Integrity: Integrity is split into three distinct classes: Discretionary,
Mandatory, and Separation of Duties. Each of these Classes have a
range of levels:
Integrity/Discretionary Protection: ID - ID 3
Integrity/Mandatory Protection: IM - IM 3
Integrity/Separation-of-Duties: IS - IS 4
Availability: Unknown at the present time.
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Accountability: Accountability is split into three distinct classes: Identification and
Authentication, Audit, and Trusted Path. Each of these Classes
have a range of levels:
Accountability/Identification & Authentication: WI - Wl 3
Accountability/Audit: WA - WA 3
Accountability/Trusted Path: WT - WT 2
Assurance: Assurance is one class. This class covers the following range:
Assurance/Operational Trust: TO - TO 6
Assurance/Life Cycle Trust: TL - TL 6
Assurance/Documentation: TD - TD 6
79
^CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality is broken down into constituent components. Each component
describes a distinct and separate portion of the whole we call Confidentiality. These
components are: discretionary protection, mandatory protection, partitions, and object
reuse.
A. DISCRETIONARY PROTECTION
Levels within this division provide for discretionary protection at the control of the
owner.
1. Level CD-0: Noncompliant
This level, Confidentiality/Discretionary Protection Level (CD-0) is reserved
for those products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of
the Discretionary Protection required by confidentiality.
2. Level CD-I: Discretionary Security Protection
A confidentiality/Discretionary Protection Level 1 (CD-I) system nominally
satisfies discretionary protection requirements by providing separations of users and data.
It incorporates some form of credible controls capable of enforcing access limitations on
an individual basis, i.e., suitable for allowing users to be able to protect private
information and to keep other users from accidentally reading or destroying their data. The
CD-I environment is expected to be one of cooperating users processing data at the same
level(s) of sensitivity.
The product shall define and control access between named users and named
objects (e.g., files and programs). The enforcement mechanism shall allow users to
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specify and control sharing of named objects by named individuals or defined groups of
named individuals or both.
3. Level CD-2: Controlled Access Protection
Confidentiality/Discretionary Protection Level 2 (henceforth CD-2) products
enforce a more finely grained discretionary protection than CD-I products and provide a
limited form of resource isolation.
The product protection mechanisms shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs). The enforcement mechanism
shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by named individuals, or
defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of
access rights. The discretionary protection mechanism shall provide that objects are
protected from unauthorized access. This protection shall be capable of including or
excluding access to granularity of a single user. Access permission to an object by users not
already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by authorized users.
4. Level CD-3: Enhanced Controlled Access Protection
Confidentiality/Discretionary Protection Level 3 (henceforth CD-3) products
enforce a more finely grained discretionary protection and provide a much stronger form
of resource isolation than CD-2 products.
The product protection mechanisms shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the EDP system. The
enforcement mechanism shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects
and shall provide controls to limit propagation of access rights. The discretionary
protection mechanism shall provide that objects are protected from unauthorized access.
This protection shall be capable of specifying, for each such named object, a list of named
individuals and a list of groups of named individuals with their respective modes of access
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to that object. Furthermore, for each such named object it shall be possible to specify a list
of named individuals and a list of groups of named individuals for which no access is to be
given. Access permission to an object by users not already possessing access permission
shall only be assigned by authorized users.
B. MANDATORY PROTECTION
Products in this division must include mechanisms which use labels to enforce a set of
mandatory protection rules. The labels must be associated with all objects in the product.
The system developer must provide the security policy model on which the protection
mechanisms are based and must furnish a specification for the protection mechanisms.
1. Level CM-0: Noncompliant
This level, Confidentiality/Mandatory Protection Level (CM-0) is reserved for
those products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the
Mandatory Protection required by confidentiality.
2. Level CM-1: Labelled Security Protection
An informal statement of the security policy model, data labelling, and
mandatory protection over named subjects and objects must be provided. The capability
must exist for accurately labelling exported information.
a. Labels
Labels associated with each subject and storage object under its control (e.g.,
process, file, segment, device) shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used
as the basis for mandatory protection decisions. In order to import non-labelled data, the
TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the label of the data, and all such
actions shall be auditable by the TCB.
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( 1 ) Label Accuracy. Labels shall accurately represent the sensitivity of the
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported by the TCB,
labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal labels and shall be
associated with the information being exported.
(2) Exportation of Labelled Information. The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. Any change in
this designation shall be done manually. The TCB shall maintain any change in the label
associated with a communication channel or I/O device.
(a) Exportation to Multilevel Devices. When TCB exports an object to
a multilevel I/O device, the label associated with that object shall also be exported and shall
reside on the same physical medium as the exported information and shall be in the same
form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form). When TCB exports or imports an
object over a multilevel communication channel, the protocol used on that channel shall
provide for the unambiguous pairing between the labels and the associated information that
is sent or received.
(b) Exportation to Single-level Devices. Single-level I/O devices and
single-level communication channels are not required to maintain the labels of the
information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which the TCB
and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the label of information imported
or exported via single-level communication channels or I/O devices.
(c) Labelling Human-Readable Output. The EDP system administrator
shall be able to specify the printable label names associated with exported labels. The TCB
shall mark the beginning and end of all human-readable paged, hardcopy output (e.g., line
printer output) with human-readable labels that properly represent the sensitivity of the
output. The TCB shall, by default, mark the top and bottom of each page of human
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readable, paged hardcopy output (e.g., line printer output) with human-readable labels that
properly represent the overall sensitivity of the output or that properly represent the
sensitivity of the information on the page. The TCB shall, by default and in an appropriate
manner, mark other forms of human-readable labels that properly represent the sensitivity
of the output.
3. Level CM-2: Structured Protection
In Confidentiality/Mandatory Protection Level 2 (CM-2) systems, the TCB is based
on a clearly defined and documented formal security policy model that requires the
mandatory protection enforcement found in CM-1 systems to be extended to all subjects
and objects in the EDP system. The TCB must be carefully structured into protection-
critical elements.
a. Labels
Sensitivity labels associated with each EDP system resource (e.g., subject,
storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subject external to the TCB
shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory
protection decisions. In order to import non-labelled data, the TCB shall request and
receive from an authorized user the sensitivity level of the data, and all such actions shall
be auditable by the TCB.
(1) Label Accuracy. Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent the
sensitivity of the specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported
by the TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.
(2) Exportation of Labelled Information. The TCB shall specify each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. Any change in
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this designation shall be done manually. The TCB shall maintain any change in the
sensitivity levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device.
(a) Exportation to Multilevel Devices. When TCB exports an object to
a multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information and
shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form). When TCB
exports or imports an object over a multilevel communication channel, the protocol used
on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing between the labels and the
associated information that is sent or received.
(b) Exportation to Single-level Devices. Single-level I/O devices and
single-level communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of
the information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which the
TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the sensitivity of
information imported or exported via single-level communication channels or I/O devices.
(c) Labelling Human-Readable Output. The EDP system administrator
shall be able to specify the printable label names associated with exported labels. The TCB
shall mark the beginning and end of all human-readable paged, hardcopy output (e.g., line
printer output) with human-readable labels that properly represent the sensitivity of the
output. The TCB shall, by default, mark the top and bottom of each page with human-
readable sensitivity labels that properly represent the overall sensitivity of the output or that
properly represent the sensitivity of the information on the page. The TCB shall, by default
and in an appropriate manner, mark other forms of human-readable output (e.g., maps,
graphics) with human-readable sensitivity labels that properly represent the sensitivity of
the output. Any override of these marking defaults shall be auditable by the TCB.
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(3) Subject Sensitivity Labels. The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal
user of each change in the sensitivity associated with that user during an interactive session.
A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of the subject's
complete sensitivity label.
(4) Device Labels. The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and
maximum sensitivity to all attached physical devices. These sensitivity shall be used by the
TCB to enforce constraint imposed by the physical environments in which the devices are
located.
4. Level CM-3: Security Domains
The Confidentiality/Mandatory Protection Level 3 (CM-3) TCB must satisfy the
reference monitor requirements that it mediate all accesses of subjects to objects, be
tamper-proof, and be small enough to be subjected to analysis and test. To this end, the
TCB is structured to exclude code not essential to security policy enforcement, with
significant system engineering during TCB design and implementation directed toward
minimizing its complexity. A security administrator is supported, audit mechanisms are
expanded to signal security-relevant events, and system recovery procedures are required.
The system is highly resistant to penetration.
a. Labels
Sensitivity labels associated with each EDP system resource (e.g., subject,
storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subject external to the TCB
shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory
protection decisions. In order to import non-labelled data, the TCB shall request and
receive from an authorized user the sensitivity level of the data, and all such actions shall




Label Accuracy. Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent the
sensitivity of the specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported
by the TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.
(2) Exportation of Labelled Information. The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. Any change in
this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the TCB. The TCB shall
maintain and be able to audit any change in the sensitivity levels associated with a
communication channel or I/O device.
(a) Exportation to Multilevel Devices. When TCB exports an object to
a multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information and
shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form). When the TCB
exports or imports an object over a multilevel communication channel, the protocol used
on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing between the sensitivity labels
and the associated information that is sent or received.
(b) Exportation to Single-level Devices. Single-level I/O devices and
single-level communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of
the information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which the
TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the sensitivity of
information imported or exported via single-level communication channels or I/O devices.
(c) Labelling Human-Readable Output. The EDP system administrator
shall be able to specify the printable label names associated with exported sensitivity labels.
The TCB shall mark the beginning and end of all human-readable paged, hardcopy output
(e.g., line printer output) with human-readable sensitivity labels that properly represent the
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sensitivity of the output. The TCB shall, by default, mark the top and bottom of each page
of human-readable, paged, hardcopy output (e.g., line printer output) with human-readable
sensitivity labels of the output or that properly represent the sensitivity of the information
on the page. The TCB shall, by default and in an appropriate manner, mark other forms of
human-readable output with sensitivity labels that properly represent the sensitivity of the
output. Any override of these marking defaults shall be auditable by the TCB.
(3) Subject Sensitivity Labels. The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal
user of each change in the sensitivity associated with that user during an interactive session.
A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of the subject's
complete sensitivity label.
(4) Device Labels. The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and
maximum sensitivity to all attached physical devices. These sensitivity shall be used by the
TCB to enforce constraint imposed by the physical environments in which the devices are
located.
C. PARTITIONS: HIERARCHIES AND COMPARTMENTS
1. Level CP-0: Noncompliant
This level, Confidentiality/Partitions: Hierarchies and Compartments Level
(CP-O) is reserved for those products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the
requirements of any of the Partitions requirements of confidentiality.
2. Level CP- 1: Compartments
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory protection policy over all subjects and storage
objects under its control (i.e., processes, files, segments, devices). These subjects and
objects shall be assigned labels that designate partitions of data which can be combined in
specific structures defined by the security policy as described by the TCB. These labels
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shall be used as the basis for mandatory protection decisions. The protection mechanism
shall be able to support multiple compartments which shall separate user workspaces into
well defined, and protected areas.
3. Level CP-2: Compartmentalized Hierarchies
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory protection policy over all resources (i.e.,
subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices) that are directly or indirectly accessible by
subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and objects shall be assigned hierarchical
levels and non-hierarchical compartments, and these shall be used as the basis for
mandatory protection decisions. The TCB shall be able to support multiple hierarchical
levels each capable of containing multiple, non-hierarchical components.
4. Level CP-3: Multiple Compartmentalized Hierarchies
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory protection policy over all resources (i.e.,
subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices) that are directly or indirectly accessible by
subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and objects shall be assigned hierarchical
levels and non-hierarchical compartments, and these shall be used as the basis for
mandatory protection decisions. The TCB shall be able to support at least two distinct
hierarchies, each of which is capable of containing multiple non-hierarchical
compartments.
5. Level CP-4: Embedded Hierarchies and Compartments
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory protection policy over all resources (i.e.,
subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices) that are directly or indirectly accessible by
subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and objects shall be assigned hierarchical
levels and non-hierarchical compartments, and these shall be used as the basis for
mandatory protection decisions. The TCB shall be able to support multiple hierarchical
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levels each capable of containing multiple non-hierarchical components, each of which
contain embedded hierarchies and compartments. The TCB shall be able to support at least
three embedded levels.
I). OBJECT RE-USE
1. Level CR-0: Noncompliant
This level, Confidentiality/Object Re-Use Level (CR-0) is reserved for those
products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the object
reuse controls required by confidentiality.
2. Level CR- 1 : Object Re-Use
All authorizations to the information contained within a storage object shall be
revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation of the object to a subject from
the product's pool of unused storage objects. No information produced by a prior subject's
action is to be available to any subject that obtain access to an object that has been released
back to the system. Encrypted representations of information will only be considered as
unavailable if the encryption mechanism has been specifically approved for such an
application by the certification authority.
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III.INTEGRITY
The Integrity Criteria for the Indonesian Navy are being developed as the loose form
dual of the confidentiality criteria. The basic structure of the integrity criteria is expected
to follow that of the confidentiality criteria and will be based on recent work in the area of
integrity by Clark and Wilson and others. It would be helpful if any efforts by the NCSC
in this area were available. The following sections contains the proposed structure of the
integrity criteria.
A. DISCRETIONARY PROTECTION
Levels within this division provide for discretionary protection - at the control of the
owner.
1. Level ID-0: Noncompliant
This level, Integrity/Discretionary Protection Level (ID-O) is reserved for those
products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the
Discretionary Protection required by integrity.
2. Level ID-1: Discretionary Execution Protection
An Integrity/Discretionary Protection Level 1 (ID-1) product nominally satisfies
the discretionary requirements by providing separation of users and data. It incorporates
some form of credible controls capable of enforcing access limitations on an individual
basis.
The TCB shall define and control execution of named processes by named
subjects (e.g., users, processes) in the ADP system. The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/
group/public controls, execution control lists, etc.) shall allow users to specify and control
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execution of named processes by named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or
by both, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of execution rights.
3. Level ID-2: Discretionary Execution Protection
The TCB shall define and control execution of named processes by named
subjects (e.g., users, processes) in the ADP system. The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/
group/public controls, execution lists, etc.) shall allow users to specify and control
execution of named processes by named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or
by both, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of execution rights. The
discretionary execution control mechanism shall, either by explicit action or by default,
provide that processes are protected from unauthorized invocation. These execution
controls shall be capable of including execution to the granularity of a single subject (e.g.,
user, process, etc.). Invocation privileges shall only be assigned by authorized users.
4. Level ID-3: Discretionary Execution Protection
The TCB shall define and control execution of named processes by named
subjects (e.g., users, processes) in the ADP system. The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/
group/public controls, execution lists, etc.) shall allow users to specify and control
execution of named processes by named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or
by both, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of execution rights. These
execution controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named process, a list of named
subjects and a list of groups of named subjects with invocation privileges for a named
process. Furthermore, for each such named process, it shall be possible to specify a list of




1. Level IM-0: Noncompliant
This level is reserved for those products that have been evaluated but fail to meet
the requirements for a higher level.
2. Level IM-I: Mandatory Execution Protection
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory execution control policy over all processes.
These processes shall be assigned integrity labels and the labels shall be used as the basis
for mandatory execution control decisions. The TCB shall be able to support N or more
integrity domains. Requirements for invocation privileges shall be specified by an
authorized subject external to TCB. Identification and authentication data shall be used by
the TCB to authenticate the identify of a user invoking a process and to ensure that the
integrity attributes of the subjects external to the TCB that are invoked on behalf of the
individual user are consistent with the integrity attributes of that user (Note:"are consistent
with" must be defined).
3. Level IM-2: Mandatory Execution Protection
The TCB shall enforce a mandatory execution control policy over all processes
that can be directly or indirectly invoked by subjects external to the TCB. Requirements for
direct or indirect invocation of any process by any subject external to the TCB shall be
specified by an authorized subject external to the TCB. Identification and authentication
data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the identify of a user invoking a process and
to ensure that the integrity attributes of the subjects external to the TCB that are invoked on
behalf of the individual user are consistent with the integrity attributes of that user
(Note:"are consistent with" must be defined).
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C. SEPARATION OF DUTIES
Products in this division must include mechanisms by which to separate and define
various functions within the system. The granularity defined by the system relates directly
to the level which it attains.
1. Level IS-0: Noncompliant
This level. Separation of Duties Level (IS-0) is reserved for those products
which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the separation of
duties required by the integrity criteria.
2. Level IS- 1: Basic Separation
The system is broken down into two domains: User and System Administrator.
This form of separation is considered minimal and may not be sufficient for more secure
systems. It must be shown that two domains are separate and that a user can not become
system administrator except from specific, verified locations (i.e., system console).
3. Level IS-2: Administrative Separation
The system separates users by type: System Administrator, Operator, User, etc.
Each user has specific tasks which are attached to the user type. Each user type is unique
and non-overlapping.
4. Level IS-3: Administrative Compartmentalization
The system separates users by type (System Administrator, Operator, User, etc.)
but each is restricted to the form of on-line interaction. Some administrative tasks are
mutually exclusive while others can not be done on a live system. Each user type is mapped
out and defined in terms of interaction with the other. Some administrative duties must be
done in two-man rule, requiring two, distinct user types to be active for a specific duty to
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be accomplished. Certain duties shall require that the system be unavailable to normal
users, such as system recovery and backup.
5. Level IS-4: Logical Separation
The system is broken down into domains corresponding to logical uses of the
system. Each domain is non-overlapping and self-contained (compartmentalized). Users






The accountability criteria are drawn directly from the TCSEC. Consideration will be
given to developing them further based on requirements to more completely support
integrity issues.
A. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
1. Level WI-0: Noncompliant
This level, Accountability/Identification And Authentication Level (WI-O) is
reserved for those products which have been evaluated under the Accountability/
Identification And Authentication Criteria but have failed to meet the requirements for a
higher evaluation class.
2. Level WI-1: Discretionary Security Protection
User shall be required to identify themselves to the TCB before beginning to
perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall
use a protected mechanisms to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect
authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.
3. Level WI-2: Controlled Access Protection
User shall be required to identify themselves to the TCB before beginning to
perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall
use a protected mechanisms to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect
authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall
be able to enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify
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each individual EDP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.
4. Level WI-3: Labelled Security Protection
User shall be required to identify themselves to the TCB before beginning to
perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall
maintain authentication data that includes information for verifying the identity of
individual users (e.g. passwords) as well as information for determining the clearance and
authorizations of individual users. This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the
user's identity. The TCB shall protect authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by
any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able to enforce individual accountability by
providing the capability to uniquely identify each individual EDP system user. The TCB
shall also provide the capability of associating this identity with all auditable actions taken
by that individual.
B. AUDIT
1. Level WA-0: Noncompliant
This level, Accountability/Audit Level (WA-0) is reserved for those products
which have been evaluated under the Accountability/Audit Criteria but have failed to meet
the requirements for a higher evaluation class.
2. Level WA-1: Controlled Access Protection
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification or
unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it protects. The
audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are
authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record, at minimum, the following type
of events: user of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects into
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a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), deletion of objects, actions taken
by computer operators and system administrator and/or system security officers, and other
security relevant events. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and
time of the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the audit
record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for object
deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object. The EDP system
administrator shall be able to selectively audit the action of any one or more users based on
individual identity.
3. Level WA-2: Labelled Security Protection
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification or
unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it protects. The
audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are
authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record, at minimum, the following type
of events: user of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects into
a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), deletion of objects, actions taken
by computer operators and system administrator and/or system security officers, and other
security relevant events. The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-
readable output markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and
time of the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the audit
record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for object
deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the object's
sensitivity. The EDP system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the actions of
any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object sensitivity.
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4. Level WA-3: Structured Protection
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification or
unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it protects. The
audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are
authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record, at minimum, the following type
of events: user of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects into
a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), deletion of objects, actions taken
by computer operators and system administrator and/or system security officers, and other
security relevant events. The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-
readable output markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and
time of the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the audit
record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for object
deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the object's
sensitivity. The EDP system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the action of
any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object sensitivity. The TCB shall
be able to audit the identified events that may be used in the exploitation of covert storage
channels.
5. Level WA-4: Security Domains
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification or
unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it protects. The
audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are
authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record, at minimum, the following type
of events: user of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects into
a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), deletion of objects, actions taken
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by computer operators and system administrator and/or system security officers, and other
security relevant events. The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-
readable output markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and
time of the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the audit
record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for object
deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the object's
sensitivity. The EDP system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the action of
any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object sensitivity. The EDP
system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the actions of any one or more users
based on individual identity and/or object security level. The TCB shall be able to audit the
identified events that may be used in the exploitation of covert storage channels. The TCB
shall contain a mechanism that is able to monitor the occurrence or accumulation of
security auditable events that may indicate an imminent violation of security policy. This
mechanism shall be able to immediately notify the security administrator when threshold
are exceeded and, if the occurrence or accumulation of these security relevant events
continues, the system shall take the least disruptive action to terminate the event.
C. TRUSTED PATH
1. Level WT-0: Noncompliant
This level, Accountability/Trusted Path Level (WT-0) is reserved for those
products that have been evaluated under the Accountability/Trusted Path Criteria but have
failed to meet the requirements for a higher evaluation class.
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2. Level VVT-1: Structured Protection
The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between itself and user for
initial login and authentication. Communications via this path shall be initiated exclusively
by a user.
3. Level WT-2: Security Domains
The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between itself and user for
use when a positive TCB-to-user connection is required (e.g., login, change subject
sensitivity). Communications via this trusted path shall be activated exclusively by a user




The assurance criteria are used to establish the degree to which evidential support and
subsequent reasoning exists about the degree to which the chosen product mechanisms and
design will, throughout the life of a product, support the specified product security policy.
The initial draft of the assurance criteria directly extracted from the TCSEC.
Additional factors (such as the development environment, hardware design control,
intrusion detection) will be considered for further specification of the criteria.
A. OPERATIONAL TRUST
Product Integrity
For all levels of operational trust, hardware and/or software features shall provided
that can be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
1. Level TO-0: Noncompliant
This level, Assurance/Operational Trust Level (TO-0), is reserved for those
products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the
operational trust mechanisms required by assurance.
2. Level TO- 1: Vendor Assured
a. Product Architecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures).
Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset of the subjects and objects in the
EDP product.
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3. Level TO-2: Independently Tested
a. Product Architecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures).
Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset of the subjects and objects in the
EDP product. The TCB shall isolate the resources to be protected so that they are subject
to the protection and auditing requirements.
4. Level TO-3: independently Assured
a. Product Architecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures).
Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset of the subjects and objects in the
EDP product. The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the provision of distinct
address space under its control. The TCB shall isolate the resources to be protected so that
they are subject to the protection and auditing requirements.
5. Level TO-4: Structured Design
a. Product Architecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures). The
TCB shall maintain process isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces under
this control. The TCB shall be internally structured into well-defined largely independent
modules. It shall make effective use of available hardware to separate those elements that
are protection-critical from those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that
the principle of least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation,
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shall be used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and all
elements of the TCB identified.
b. Covert Channel A nalysis
The product developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert storage
channels and make a determination (either by actual measurement or by engineering
estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel.
c. Trusted Facility Management
The TCB shall support separate operator and system administrator functions.
6. Level TO-5: Rigorous Design/Security Domains
a. Product A rch itecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures). The
TCB shall maintain process isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces under
this control. The TCB shall be internally structured into well-defined largely independent
modules. It shall make effective use of available hardware to separate those elements that
are protection-critical from those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that
the principle of least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation,
shall be used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and all
elements of the TCB identified. The TCB shall be designed and structured to use a
complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics.
This mechanism shall play a central role in enforcing the internal structuring of the TCB
and the product. The TCB shall incorporate significant use of layering, abstraction and data
105
hiding. Significant product engineering shall be directed toward minimizing the complexity
of the TCB and excluding from the TCB modules that are no protection-critical.
b. Covert Channel A nalysis
The product developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert storage
channels and make a determination (either by actual measurement or by engineering
estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel.
c. Trusted Facility Management
The TCB shall support separate operator and system administrator functions.
The functions performed in the role of a security administrator shall be defined. The EDP
product administrative personnel shall only be able to perform security administrator
functions after taking a distinct auditable action to assume the security administrator role
on the EDP product. Non-security functions that can be performed in the security
administration role shall be limited strictly to those essential to performing the security role
effectively.
d. Trusted Recovery
Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure that, after an EDP
product failure of other discontinuity, recovery without a protection compromise is
obtained.
7. Level TO-6: Formal Design
a. Product Architecture
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from
external interference of tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or data structures). The
TCB shall maintain process isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces under
this control. The TCB shall be internally structured into well-defined largely independent
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modules. It shall make effective use of available hardware to separate those elements that
are protection-critical from those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that
the principle of least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation,
shall be used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and all
elements of the TCB identified. The TCB shall be designed and structured to use a
complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics.
This mechanism shall play a central role in enforcing the internal structuring of the TCB
and the product. The TCB shall incorporate significant use of layering, abstraction and data
hiding. Significant product engineering shall be directed toward minimizing the complexity
of the TCB and excluding from the TCB modules that are no protection-critical.
b. Covert Channel Analysis
The product developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert storage
channels and make a determination (either by actual measurement or by engineering
estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel. Formal methods shall
be use in the analysis.
c. Trusted Facility Management
The TCB shall support separate operator and system administrator functions.
The functions performed in the role of a security administrator shall be identified. The EDP
product administrative personnel shall only be able to perform security administrator
functions after taking a distinct auditable action to assume the security administrator role
on the EDP product. Non-security functions that can be performed in the security




Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure that, after an EDP
product failure of other discontinuity, recovery without a protection compromise is
obtained.
B. LIFE CYCLE TRUST
Configuration Management (levels 1 - 5)
During development and maintenance of any TCB, a configuration management
system shall be in place that maintains control of changes to the descriptive top-level
specification, other design data, implementation documentation, source code, the running
version of the object code, and test fixtures and documentation. The configuration
management product shall assure a consistent mapping among all documentation and code
associated with the current version of the TCB. Tools shall be provided for generation of a
new version of the TCB from source code. Also available shall be tools for comparing a
newly generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain that only the
intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the new version
of the TCB.
1. Level TL-0: Noncompliant
This level, Assurance/Life Cycle Trust Level (TO-0), is reserved for those
products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the life
cycle trust mechanisms required by assurance.
2. Level TL-1: Vendor Assured
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. Testing shall be done to assure that there
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are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to by pass or otherwise defeat the security
protection mechanisms of the TCB.
3. Level TL-2: Independently Tested
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. Testing shall be done to assure that there
are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to by pass or otherwise defeat the security
protection mechanisms of the TCB. Testing shall also include a search for obvious flaws
that would allow violation of resource isolation, or that would permit unauthorized access
to the audit or authentication data.
4. Level TL-3: Independently Assured
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. A team of individuals who thoroughly
understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its design documentation,
source code, and object code to thorough testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all
design and implementation flaws that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read,
change, or delete data normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy
enforced by the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so)
is able to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications
initiated by other users. All discovered flaws shall be removed or neutralized and the TCB
retested to demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been
introduced.
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b. Design Specification and Verification
An informal or formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB
shall be maintained over the life cycle of the EDP product and demonstrated to be consisted
with its axioms.
5. Level TL-4: Structured Design
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. A team of individuals who thoroughly
understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its design documentation,
source code, and object code to thorough analysis and testing. Their objectives shall be: to
uncover all design and implementation flaws that would permit a subject external to the
TCB to read, change, or delete data normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary
security policy enforced by the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without
authorization to do so) is able to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to
respond to communications initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found relatively
resistant to penetration. All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to
demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced.
Testing shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive
top-level specification.
b. Design Specification and Verification
A formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB shall be
maintained over the life cycle of the EDP product that is proven consistent with its axioms.
A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that
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completely and accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and
effects. It shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface.
6. Level TL-5: Rigorous Design/Security Domains
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. A team of individuals who thoroughly
understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its design documentation,
source code, and object code to thorough analysis and testing. Their objectives shall be: to
uncover all design and implementation flaws that would permit a subject external to the
TCB to read, change, or delete data normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary
security policy enforced by the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without
authorization to do so) is able to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to
respond to communications initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found relatively
resistant to penetration. All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to
demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced.
Testing shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive
top-level specification. No design flaws and no more than a few correctable
implementation flaws may be found during testing and there shall be reasonable confidence
that few remain.
b. Design Specification and Verification
A formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB shall be
maintained over the life cycle of the EDP product that is proven consistent with its axioms.
A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that
completely and accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and
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effects. It shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface. A convincing
argument shall be given that the DTLS is consistent with the model.
7. Level TL-6: Formal Design
a. Security Testing
The security mechanisms of the EDP product shall be tested and found to
work as claimed in the product documentation. A team of individuals who thoroughly
understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its design documentation,
source code, and object code to thorough analysis and testing. Their objectives shall be: to
uncover all design and implementation flaws that would permit a subject external to the
TCB to read, change, or delete data normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary
security policy enforced by the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without
authorization to do so) is able to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to
respond to communications initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found relatively
resistant to penetration. All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to
demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced.
Testing shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive
top-level specification. No design flaws and no more than a few correctable
implementation flaws may be found during testing and there shall be reasonable confidence
that few remain. Manual or other mapping of the FTLS to the source code may form a basis
for penetration testing.
b. Design Specification and Verification
A formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB shall be
maintained over the life cycle of the EDP product that is proven consistent with its axioms.
A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that
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completely and accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and
effects. A formal top-level specification (FTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that
accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. The
DTLS and FTLS shall include those components of the TCB that are implemented as
hardware and/or firmware if their properties are visible at the TCB interface. The FTLS
shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface. A convincing argument
shall be given that the DTLS is consistent with the model and a combination of formal and
informal techniques shall be used to show that the FTLS is consistent with the model. This
verification evidence shall be consistent with that provided within the state-of-the-art of the
particular Indonesian Navy-endorsed formal specification and verification system used.
A
mapping (manual otherwise) of the FTLS to the TCB source shall be performed to provide
evidence of correct implementation.
c. Configuration Management (Level 6 Additional Requirements)
This section supercedes the configuration management requirements of level
TL- 1 to TL-5 for level TL-6 only.
During the entire life-cycle, i.e., during the design, development, and
maintenance of the TCB, a configuration management system shall be in place for all
security-relevant hardware, firmware, software that maintains control of changes to the
formal model, the descriptive and formal top-level specifications, other design data,
implementation documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, and
test fixtures and documentation. The configuration management system shall assure a
consistent mapping among all documentation and code associated with the current version
of the TCB. Tools shall be provided for generation of a new version of the TCB from source
code. Also available shall be tools, maintained under strict configuration control, for
comparing a newly generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain
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that only the intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the
new version of TCB. A combination of technical, physical, and procedural safeguards shall
be used to protect from an unauthorized modification or destruction the master copy or
copies of all material used to generate the TCB.
d. Trusted Distribution
A trusted EDP product control and distribution facility shall be provided for
maintaining the integrity of the mapping between the master data describing the current
version of the TCB and the on-site master copy of the code for the current version.
Procedures (e.g., site security acceptance testing) shall exist for assuring that the TCB
software, firmware, and hardware updates distributed to a customer are exactly as specified
by the master copies.
C. DOCUMENTATION
1. Level TD-0: Noncompliant
This level, Assurance/Documentation Level (TD-0), is reserved for those
products which have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements of any of the
documentation required by assurance.
2. Level TD-1: Vendor Assured
a. Documentation
( 1 ) Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
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(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct modules, the
interfaces between these modules shall be described.




Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
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(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct modules, the
interfaces between these modules shall be described.




Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.
The manual shall describe the operator and system administrator functions related to
security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the product, how
they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility procedures, warnings, and
privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate the facility in a secure manner.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct modules, the
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interfaces between these modules shall be described. An informal or formal description of
security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be available and an explanation provided
to show that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy. The specific TCB protection
mechanisms shall be identified and an explanation given to show that they satisfy the
model.
5. Level TD-4: Structured Design
a. Documentation
( 1 ) Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.
The manual shall describe the operator and system administrator functions related to
security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the product, how
they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility procedures, warnings, and
privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate the facility in a secure manner. The
TCB modules that contain the reference validation mechanism shall be identified. The
procedures for secure generation of a new TCB from source after modification of any
modules in the TCB shall be described.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
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security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce covert
channel bandwidth.
(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB modules shall be
described. A formal description of security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be
available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy. The specific TCB
protection mechanisms shall be identified and an explanation given to show that they
satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an
accurate description of the TCB interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB
implements the reference monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper
resistant, cannot be bypassed, and is correctly implemented. Documentation shall describe
how the TCB is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This
documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the trade-
offs involved in restricting the channels. All auditable events that may be used in the
exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. The bandwidth of known
covert storage channels, the use of which is not detectable by the auditing mechanisms,
shall be provided.
6. Level TD-5: Rigorous Design/Security Domains
a. Documentation
( 1 ) Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
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(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.
The manual shall describe the operator and system administrator functions related to
security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the product, how
they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility procedures, warnings, and
privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate the facility in a secure manner. The
TCB modules that contain the reference validation mechanism shall be identified. The
procedures for secure generation of a new TCB from source after modification of any
modules in the TCB shall be described. It shall include the procedures to ensure that the
product is initially started in a secure manner. Procedures shall also be included to resume
secure product operation after any lapse in product operation.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce covert
channel bandwidth.
(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer ' s philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB modules shall be
described. A formal description of security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be
available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy. The specific TCB
protection mechanisms shall be identified and an explanation given to show that they
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satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an
accurate description of the TCB interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB
implements the reference monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper
resistant, cannot be bypassed, and is correctly implemented. The TCB implementation (i.e.,
in hardware, firmware and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with the
DTLS. The elements of the DTLS shall be shown, using informal techniques, to correspond
to the elements of the TCB. Documentation shall describe how the TCB is structured to
facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This documentation shall also present the
results of the covert channel analysis and the trade-offs involved in restricting the channels.
All auditable events that may be used in the exploitation of known covert storage channels
shall be identified. The bandwidth of known covert storage channels, the use of which is
not detectable by the auditing mechanisms, shall be provided.
7. Level TD-6: Formal Design
a. Documentation
( 1 ) Security Feature User's Guide. A single summary, chapter, or manual in
user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
(2) Trusted Facility Manual. A manual addressed to the EDP product
administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled
when running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.
The manual shall describe the operator and system administrator functions related to
security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the product, how
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they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility procedures, warnings, and
privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate the facility in a secure manner. The
TCB modules that contain the reference validation mechanism shall be identified. The
procedures for secure generation of a new TCB from source after modification of any
modules in the TCB shall be described. It shall include the procedures to ensure that the
product is initially started in a secure manner. Procedures shall also be included to resume
secure product operation after any lapse in product operation.
(3) Test Documentation. The product developer shall provide to the
evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the
security mechanisms were tested, and result of the security mechanisms 1 functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce covert
channel. The results of the mapping between the formal top-level specification and the TCB
source code shall be given.
(4) Design Documentation. Documentation shall be available that provides
a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this
philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB modules shall be
described. A formal description of security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be
available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy. The specific TCB
protection mechanisms shall be identified and an explanation given to show that they
satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an
accurate description of the TCB interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB
implements the reference monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper
resistant, cannot be bypassed, and is correctly implemented. The TCB implementation (i.e.,
in hardware, firmware and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with the
formal top-level specification (FTLS). The elements of the FTLS shall be shown, using
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informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB. Documentation shall
describe how the TCB is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This
documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the trade-
offs involved in restricting the channels. All auditable events that may be used in the
exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. The bandwidth of known
covert storage channels, the use of which is not detectable by the auditing mechanisms,
shall be provided. Hardware, firmware, and software mechanisms not dealt with in the
DTLS but strictly internal to the TCB (e.g., mapping registers, direct memory access I/O)
shall be clearly described.
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